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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Pay for performance is a method of setting very specific
performance objectives for individual employees in a company and
tieing a substantial portion of an employee's compensation to the
successful achievement of those objectives.

Pay for performance

differs from merit pay plans which have been tied more to job
standards and less defined, more subjective performance criteria.
This study is limited to investigating pay for performance
programs of other companies at the supervisory, manager and officer
levels with the goal of improving existing Corporate programs.

It

will also be limited to cash compensation, since other forms of
compensation is a study of considerable magnitude in itself.
Why look for new, more effective methods of employee
compensation?

Great Falls Gas Company (GFGC) is interested because

traditional merit pay programs have not achieved what they were
intended to achieve.

Too often the difference between a raise for

outstanding performance and one for satisfactory performance is not
enough to influence performance.1 Numerous articles researched in
this study detailed these problems time and time again, as well as
tieing into the experience of Great Falls Gas Company's nine year old
merit pay program.
The Company adjusts base pay, for each employee, under its
merit pay program, which is tied to job standards.

Performance

reviews are given to each employee every six months.
1

In addition, it

has pay for performance programs for its officers and managers and
certain other key staff.

Last year, the pay for performance concept

was extended to first line supervisors.
In the next three to five years, the plan is to have the entire
workforce on a pay for performance basis.

Company management

believes the pay for performance concept at Great Falls Gas has
proven very successful by increasing the organization's focus on key
strategic objectives, by improving corporate effectiveness in
providing better customer service at lower cost, while maximizing
returns to shareholders.

Great Falls Gas is continually reviewing its

pay for performance programs to determine effectiveness and to
make improvements where needed.
Company management is making a concerted effort in this
study to determine what other companies are doing in the pay for
performance arena and what techniques and methods are producing
the best overall results.

History of Great Falls Gas Company's
Salary Program
The Board of Directors approved the pay for performance
program for managers, officers and other key staff of Great Falls Gas
Company in 1982.

The reason the Board implemented the program

was to build a sense of teamwork in the management group, for
better year to year performance for the shareholder.

2

Great Falls Gas Company also has a merit pay program which
has been in place since 1979. The salary program at GFGC has 17
different job grades with entry levels, midpoints and maximums.
The midpoints of each job grade are compared to industry pay levels
(obtained from salary surveys) each year, for similar positions.

GFGC

tries to maintain the midpoints of each job grade in line with
comparable local or regional

job positions, but when pay for

performance incentive pay is included, pay levels for high achievers
will be above comparable industry position pay for similar size
companies.

If incentive pay is not earned, then base pay will be

slightly below industry levels.
During the first four years of the Company's pay for
performance program, was based strictly on the return on equity
level earned by the corporation.

For the past two years, the program

was revised to incorporate the setting of specific performance
objectives for each participant.

More aggressive goals have been

integrated into individual performance objectives each year, which
have resulted in

higher overall organizational effectiveness.

The company must meet certain return on equity (ROE) levels.
The program currently begins at 1.25 percent below the Public
Service Commission's allowed return on equity before any bonuses
are paid.

If this threshold level of return on equity is attained, then

the other provisions of the plan trigger.
return is not met, no bonuses are paid.
is included in APPENDIX 1.

3

If the threshold level of
A copy of the Company's plan

The GFGC plan at the threshold level of earnings has two
elements: first, a return on equity of 11.00 percent (1.25 percent
below PSC Allowed ROE) in the given year must be met to have a
right to earn 50 percent of the incentive bonus pool; second, a 5 year
rolling average ROE (5 yr. avg of PSC Allowed ROE) must be met to
trigger the other 50 percent of the pool.

A rolling average is defined

as the most recent 5-year period, including the current year.

If

these two criteria are met then the employee receives 20 percent of
the total bonus automatically; the other 80 percent is tied to specific
performance objectives which are set at the beginning of each year.
The percentage of achievement of these specific objectives
determines the actual portion of the pool the individual earns.
Fiscal years 1987 and 1988 were extremely warm (warmest
since 1934) and the participants were only eligible for half of the
bonus in 1987 and none in 1988.

There is now a loud chorus of

participants who want to change the plan to where they can earn at
least a portion of the bonus despite the actual earnings level of the
Company.

The participants of this plan earned 100 percent of their

eligible bonus in the previous four years with few complaints from
the participants about the plan structure.

Proposed changes in the

Company's plans are detailed in the recommendation section of
Chapter V.
A year ago the Company extended the pay for performance
program to first line supervisors.

These supervisors control about

two-thirds of the total workforce.

Specific performance objectives

have been set for each supervisor.

Their bonus has been tied 25

4

percent to the same threshold of return on equity in the current year
as described above and 75 percent to specific performance
objectives.

This latter portion will be paid regardless of what the

Company's performance is and will be based on the percentage
achievement of their objectives.
The above described pay for performance participants are also
eligible for merit increases in pay, based on how well they perform
their day to day job duties in relation to their job standards.
increases ranged from 1.5-3.0 percent for the past year.

Merit

Because

Company earnings were so poor, due to all time record warm
weather through the middle of the second fiscal quarter of 1988, a
salary freeze was implemented beginning in the last month of the
second quarter for all supervisors, managers and officers of the
Company.

Supervisors were still eligible for their 75 percent portion

of their incentive bonus.

The salary freeze will stay in effect for

twelve months or until the earnings of the Company improve,
whichever is longer.
Each year the Company updates its strategic plan which defines
the key results areas it wants management to focus on for the next
three years.

Each department sets goals for the upcoming year based

on the ongoing corporate goals of the Company, which are:
1) Improve customer service
2) Build load on the system
3) Improve productivity
5

4) Improve employee development and challenges
Specific performance objectives are then set for each
participant from department goals and from key results areas
developed from the strategic plan of the Company.

Usually four to

eight specific performance objectives are established for each
participant in the program with the employee and his or her
supervisor agreeing on the final objectives.

Currently one quarter of

the employees (supervisors, managers, officers and key staffers) of
the Company are included in the pay for performance programs.

Objectives of This Study
Management is seeking further information in this study to
improve the Company's pay for performance program in the
following areas.

Specifically, management wants to know:

1) To what extent other companies include supervisors,
managers and officers of their companies in their pay for
performance programs?

What successes and failures have they had

with their programs?
2) How other companies structure their specific performance
objectives, to obtain ideas on how to improve the setting of specific
performance objectives, within the Company.
3) What the optimum equivalent percentage of employee's
base pay should be to provide the strongest motivational tie to
6

performance achievement.
4) What incentive compensation levels other companies are
setting for payout in total program funds and for individual
performance achievement, once performance objectives are met.
5) Whether other companies are monitoring their pay for
performance programs to determine their overall effectiveness and
how they have structured their monitoring systems.
6) What are the advantages and disadvantages of pay for
performance programs?

7

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
A review was made from secondary information sources to
determine the business world's experience with pay for performance
programs.
This method was selected because the author was aware of
several trade journal articles outlining various aspects of success and
failure of general business salary administration programs and new
pay for performance approaches.
An information search was made through the America Society
for Personnel Administration (ASPA) computer data base, covering
pay for performance articles published during the past three years.
This search developed a list of forty articles on incentive pay plans.
From this list, nineteen of the articles were secured for review, from
titles of articles and papers which appeared to be more pertinent to
the study.
Only one of these articles, which was based on AT&T's
experience, discussed pay for performance specifically for that utility
sector.

AT&T's pay for performance program was developed to help

bring them from a regulated, monoply business position to one of a
highly competitive industry environment.2 Their program consisted
of two parts, one of a special merit award plan for outstanding
individual performance and a team incentive plan for unit
performance.

The individual performance program are paid
8

regardless of total corporate performance but the team incentive
plan is tied directly to corporate performance and all participants
share equally in the plan payout.

Their incentive program cost is

considered part of average pay when making survey comparisons
with the market.

To establish the fund pools for incentive pay,

traditional merit pay increases were held and the comparable
percentage of pay increase was put at risk over a three to four year
period to establish the incentive pay funds.
Great Falls Gas Company was more interested in reviewing
criteria specifically designed for the gas utility industry.

It was for

this reason Great Falls Gas Company set about gathering its own
information from utilities through an information survey, the results
are detailed in Chapter IV.
The following paragraphs contain information on pay for
performance from secondary information sources such as periodicals,
published papers, and other studies on pay for performance.

Motivational Theories and The Tie To
Pay For Performance
There is a considerable body of research more than 100 studies
attesting to the positive effects of setting difficult, as compared to
easy, performance goals.

If managers expect very little from

subordinates, subordinates are not likely to excel; rather, low
expectations will tend to be self-fulfilling.3
9

Evidence indicates that the most powerful motivational
systems are those that provide rewards for good performance, and
withhold rewards for poor performance.4
It is not surprising to find numerous case studies and reports
of lethargy and inefficiency in public sector organizations, opting for
across the board approach to reward distributions.

Lawler has

pointed out, using pay to motivate improved job performance is not a
"piker's game".

To use pay, to motivate improved performance, it is

essential that substantial differences exist in the range of benefits
actually provided.5
Nash and Carroll, in their book The Management of
Compensation, cite the results of five early surveys encompassing
more that 4,700 interventions.

Average increases in productivity

after switching from time-based to output-based pay plans ranged
from 29 to 63 percent, the median increase being 34.5 percent.6
More recently, an extensive literature review found that, on average,
individual incentive plans increased output by 30 percent; group
incentive plans typically increased output by 18 percent.7
Additionally, a comprehensive review of productivity
experiments reported the results of seven studies which examined
the effects of financial incentives.

Results were positive in all cases,

with performance output increases ranging from 18 to 46 percent.8
Money as a motivation tool is not a new idea. It can be traced
as far back as to Julius Caesar who paid special incentives to his
army for special achievement.9 Later, ships captains received a share
10

of the profits of their voyages.

With the emergence of the

professionally managed corporations, GM implemented the modern
annual incentive plan in 1918.

Incentives spread rapidly through

dominant companies of the era: in the auto industry first, then the
steel and chemical industries, and later in retailing.

The Great

Depression put a damper on incentives during the 1930s and
extended through WWII.

Beginning in 1950 with the new tax laws

which favored stock options and for the next 15 years, the
combination of annual performance based incentives with an
effective long term option that linked executive rewards to the
company's increased stock price provided a strong link of pay to
performance.
Pay and performance linkage started diminishing in the mid1960s and began a long 15-year downhill slide when Congress began
amending the stock option and tax codes.

In the early 1970s,

research at Harvard Business School had shown that top management
bonuses were related more to the size of the firm and to position
level than to the performance of the company.10

A 1981 article in

Compensation Review purported to prove conclusively that there was
no correlation at all between pay and performance.11
There have been numerous articles published in the past few
years by Fortune. Business Week and other periodicals, stating that
many chief executive officers of American corporations had forgotten
that bonuses were supposed to be paid for output, not input.

Many

CEO's were able to sell their board of directors that they should still
get their fat bonuses even though their corporate performance was
11

poor.

With increased competition from both within the U. S. and

abroad, boards of directors are not the "easy sell" they were a few
years ago.

Also there has been a chorus of workers screaming the

"wrongs" of upper managements getting large bonuses while they
have been required to take decreases in wages and benefits.12
The magnitude of compensation to motivate management in
the direction of achieving corporate goals will be discussed in detail
from the results of the utility survey presented in the next section.
The necessary magnitude of strong motivational compensation
found in secondary sources showed that, compensation experts
generally agree that an incentive payment needs to reach a
minimum of 15 percent of base pay in order to represent a
meaningful motivating difference to plan participants.13

Problems With Most Existing Pay Plans
Why search for new more effective methods of employee
compensation?

Primarily it is done because traditional merit pay

programs have not achieved what they were intended to achieve.
Too often the difference between a raise for outstanding
performance and one for satisfactory performance is insufficient to
influence performance.14
Merit pay systems can break down because of problems with
the performance appraisal systems on which they are based.

In

practice many merit pay systems fail to consistently fulfill their
12

mission of rewarding superior performance.

In fact some merit pay

plans hinder excellent performance by causing enthusiastic
employees to become frustrated and disenchanted.
The three main problems with merit pay administration are:
1)

pay is perceived as being unrelated to job performance,

2)

secrecy of pay is related to perceived inequity; and

3)

the size of the merit increases awarded has been too small
to positively impact performance.15

Why is there a perception that compensation is unrelated to job
performance?

One problem is that there is so much time elapse

between performance and reward that the employee loses sight of
the relationship.

Also, the goals or objectives an employee is

supposed to accomplish are often unclear and not well defined.
Another factor is that merit increases are based on other
factors than performance, such as length of service, the manager's
view of future potential, or the manager's perceived need to equalize
pay with peers, where one employee's pay is low compared with that
of others in the group.16

The performance appraisal is typically an

undesirable task because the forms often do not describe what the
employee's duties really are which makes it difficult to properly rate
the employee's performance, and the employee feels that the ratings
are too subjective and do not really reflect actual performance.
While the concept of rewarding outstanding performers with a
13

pay increase appears to be straight forward, in practice it is very
difficult to implement properly.

Most organizations do not have

enough money for payroll increases in their budgets to pay for
performance.

Companies usually allot each department a set

percentage for wage increases which limits the amount of raises that
can be allowed.
Since most managers are restricted by budget constraints on
the amount of dollars they have for merit increases in their
departments, an individual's salary increase often is based on the
manager's creativity in "backing into" performance ratings to make
the numbers match up.

Often these decisions are arbitrary or

subjective, which many times enrage and often demoralize the
workers affected.
Studies have shown that the average performance appraisal
scores slowly creep up over time.17 This can be a major factor in
increasing the average size of the merit increase and causes payroll
budgets to be higher than budgeted levels.

Higher annual ratings

result from supervisor bias in the performance reviews, giving
higher scores each year whether performance is improved or not.
There is also evidence that performance scores vary substantially
from supervisor to supervisor for the same level of employee
performance, based on their view of what the ratings should be for a
given level of performance.
Employee surveys have shown that employees with high
appraisal scores believe that their appraisals reflected their true
performance, and were satisfied with their appraisal from their
supervisor. On the other hand, those employees who received
14

low supervisory appraisals were dissatisfied with their
appraisal and felt it did not reflect their true performance. At
least two conclusions are possible from these results. First, if
appraisal scores reflect true performance, then employees,
while dissatisfied, have nothing to gripe about. Second, if
appraisal scores are not reflective of true performance, then the
merit pay system is creating undesirable dissatisfaction.18
Surveys have shown that employees strongly disagree with the
concept that all employees should get equal pay raises.19

Further,

many employees appear to believe that supervisors do tend to use
performance to make pay increase decisions.

However, they

apparently think that the supervisor's evaluations are biased since
employees do not agree that their performance is reflected in their
performance evaluation or in their merit pay increase.
Dissatisfaction with a merit program is not necessarily
bad. For instance, if it is the poorest performers who are
dissatisfied with their pay increases and the highest
performers who are most satisfied, then the system is working.
In other words, the program is rewarding high performers and
giving low performers the proper feedback. Low performers
then have a choice of improving their performance or exiting
the organization.20

The Need For New Compensation Plans
Surveys have indicated that most pay raises are too small to be
effective, a survey of 2,867 companies conducted by The Wall Street
Journal in 1979 found that salary increases were too low to motivate
employees.21
Pay can be motivating if the increase is large enough in
relation to an individual's income to result in a significant change in
15

financial condition.22

The number of companies using variable

compensation below the top executive level is still fewer than 20
percent.

In general, organizations are coming to accept the necessity

of gearing pay to performance and giving employees a "cut" of the
extra value they produce.
There are many other important reasons why almost any
business today needs to implement a more effective compensation
program.

Companies that manufacture products competing with

foreign products at home and abroad must continually strive to
reduce their cost of production to be more competitive.

The market

place is very dynamic with shorter product life cycles a firm requires
a continual analysis of strategic direction, and, to be successful, an
organization must be able to change quickly with changing market
conditions and customer demands.
Utility management today, despite a natural monopoly position,
too, must be more aggressive to adapt to change.

Day to day

business transactions have become much more dynamic and complex
with deregulation of gas supplies; more competition from other
energy sources, especially industrial loads; customer by-pass by
other gas suppliers; and more stringent demands from customers,
employees, regulators and stockholders.
A prime way to gain flexibility to successfully deal with this
new world is through the development of an effective compensation
program, which leads management and the company as a whole in
the direction of strategic goals.
16

An effective program which ties pay

to performance can be the answer to many of these organizational
needs.

Is The Current Generation of Pav For Performance
Plans Producing Better Results?
Consultant and academic research is beginning to point to a
greater correlation between pay and performance.

Recent studies by

K.R. Murthy's (updated) PhD thesis23, a Hay Associates study24 and a
recent study by Kevin Murphy of the University of Rochester25 found
total compensation positively related to corporate performance as
measured by shareholders' total return.26
With the decline in the cost of living, compensation increases
began to slow perceptibly in 1984, a trend that is likely to continue
throughout the balance of the 1980s.

Developments in the long term

incentive area are also encouraging and bear witness to the viability
of the pay for performance ethic.

There is a renewed interest in

stock options and the emergence of a second generation of
performance unit plans.

The latter reflects a more sophisticated

understanding about the nature of performance measures that
influence stock price performance, such as return on stockholders'
equity.
The previous paragraphs contain discussion on the pros and
cons of pay for performance programs.

The following is a summary

of the generally argued pros and cons of pay for performance
17

programs, as described by Mr. Thomas Rollins, PhD, Hay Management
Consultants.27
Advantages:
1)

Money can serve as an extremely effective motivator of
employee performance.

2)

Superior employees resent automatic and indiscriminate
pay increases for all.
3) Tying pay to performance puts teeth in the performance
appraisal process.

4)

Good pay for performance programs increase clarity of
employee goals.

5)

Pay for performance programs can give organizations much
greater mileage for their compensation dollar.

6)

Good pay for performance programs increase employees'
sense of ownership and involvement in overall company
performance.

7)

Pay for performance systems are conducive to a "no
surprise" policy of performance evaluation.

18

8)

Pay for performance programs encourage employees to
track their own performance against pre-established
targets, thus creating a sense of challenge to improve levels
of work efficiency.

Disadvantages:
1)

Many employees are of a mind set where they prefer the
security and guarantee of automatic increases.

2)

Most pay for performance programs reward individual
performance which is counter to establishing team efforts.

3)

The need to generate tailored goals and measures that go
beyond just budget numbers exceeds the capacity of many
organizations to manage.

4)

Employees view pay for performance not as a way of
stimulating performance, but to contain compensation.

19

CHAPTER in
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Great Falls Gas, in order to obtain specific information on gas
utility programs conducted a mail and telephone survey of seventeen
gas utility companies with pay for performance programs.

The

survey was conducted during the period of April 15 to May 13, 1988.
A summary of the responses to each survey question and a list of
companies which furnished information on their pay for performance
plans are included in APPENDIX 2 at the back of this report.
Participating companies surveyed are included in APPENDIX 3.
It was decided not to do a random sample of companies
because the Company was not interested in what a typical gas
utility's pay for performance program design contained.

But instead

the study was designed to gather information from utilities with
successful pay for performance programs.
A nineteen question survey form was developed by Great Falls
Gas Company and was tested in-house with the human resource
department checking it for completeness and clarity.

A copy of the

survey cover letter and survey questionnaire are included in
APPENDIX 4.
A threshold level of companies with under $140 million in
revenues was first selected from the American Gas Association's
(AGA) member list of those responding to its 1987 Executive Salary
Study indicating they had a management incentive program.
20

These

companies were first selected because it was believed that smaller
gas utilities pay for performance programs might be more
appropriate to Great Falls Gas Company than the larger utilities
programs.

Their were only nine utilities of 69 included in the AGA

Salary Study having under $140 million in revenues, which indicated
they had incentive bonus pay programs.28
Because only nine utility companies were found to be included
in the first group, under the revenue criteria selected, AGA provided
eight additional company names which they indicated had successful
management incentive programs.

These companies were larger, all

having revenues over $500 million.
Of the survey forms sent to these seventeen companies, only
three completed questionnaires were received by the two week
deadline.

Telephone calls were made to each utility; the majority

said they would like to have another form sent to them because they
had misplaced the first one.
been returned.

After one month only four forms had

All four were filled out describing their merit pay

plans instead of their pay for performance programs.

In checking

back, the person who filled out the forms was someone unfamiliar
with their upper management pay for performance program.
At this point a telephone survey was made of all seventeen
utilities on the original lists, using the survey form as the outline for
the questions.

Virtually all useable survey information obtained was

from the telephone interviews with key human resource personnel
of each company.

If the initial telephone contact found that the
21

individual was not knowledgeable about their company's pay for
performance program, follow up contacts were made until the person
with such knowledge was interviewed.

22

CHAPTER IV
SURVEY RESULTS
The telephone survey concluded with eleven companies
furnishing information on their plans. Two companies indicated they
currently did not have pay for performance programs.

The other

four companies did not choose to participate for one reason or
another.

The information in this study is from those eleven

completed surveys.

Because there was no random sample of utilities

made and because a small sample was used no statistical analysis
was attempted.
Summaries of responses for each survey question are included
in APPENDIX 2. The following paragraphs are summaries of the
survey responses.

Major Reasons for Establishing Pay
For Programs
According to survey results, utility companies established their
pay for performance programs for the following major reasons:
1)

to direct the management of the company to focus on key
results areas of the company, to improve bottom line
performance.

23

2)

to build team effort to improve performance.

3)

to help change the direction of the
organization with a constantly changing business
environment.

4)

to enhance the ability to retain and attract talented
employees.

5)

to link pay to performance.

The surveyed companies have had their pay for performance
programs from one to fifteen years, with the median program age at
5 years.
The common thread of almost all surveyed companies was that
they are attempting to enhance their existing programs or enlarge
their pay for performance programs to cover a larger portion of the
management team.

Threshold Pavout Criteria
Eight of the eleven companies responding to the survey use a
combination of group and individual performance objectives.

Two

responding companies have group pay for performance programs.

A

group plan is one where all plan participants share in the pool funds
in proportion to their base salary, regardless of their individual
24

performance.

There appeared to be less enthusiasm for this type of

program by its users than with programs where individual
achievement was the basis for allocating incentive pool funds.
All responding companies used a threshold level of earnings,
usually return on equity (ROE), to earn at least 50 percent of the
incentive fund pool.

This target must be met before the remainder

of the plan is available for possible payout.

Once the threshold level

is met, most companies rely on specific performance objective
achievement by each plan participant to distribute the pool of
incentive funds.
Some Companies use other threshold criteria than ROE, they
are:
Profit Plan Returns

Controllable Operation and

Peer Group Rankings

Maintenance Expenses

Return on Assets

Employees/Customer Ratios

Retail Rate Comparisons With Peer Group Companies
Companies who use earnings as the threshold, used various
criteria as mentioned above, but the two most popular methods
were:
1)

Comparing actual returns of the company with the

allowed rate of return set by the governing regulatory
authorities. This return in most cases was the ROE, but if
the company had other companies under its ownership
25

umbrella, it likely used return on assets.
2)

Comparing actual returns with a pre-approved profit

plan or budget.
Minimum payouts (about 50 percent) in many plans begin
when 80-85 percent of the return level set as the target objective is
achieved and usually 100 percent payout is available for distribution
when 100 percent of the target is achieved.

Most plans also payout

110 to 150 percent of target incentive if higher levels of earnings
above the target are reached.
Peer group rankings were used by three larger surveyed
companies, to determine threshold payouts.

Two of the companies

used their 10 strongest competitors to compare their ROE to and then
ranked themselves from 1 to 10.

The higher they rank with their

peer group companies, the higher their bonus pool payout.
One surveyed company ranked itself with peer group
companies by comparing its retail gas rates with peer companies in
the region for determining 30 percent of its threshold payout.
Another popular tool was to use budgeted controllable
operation and maintenance expenses as the target and setting payout
beginning at zero percent payout at budgeted levels and with higher
payouts as expense levels were actually reduced.

Comparing actual

results with budgeted figures seemed to be most popular for
companies who may be part of a larger unit.

However, it is more

difficult to determine actual return on equity, on a meaningful basis.
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One fast growing utility, included in the survey, used the ratio
of employees per customer as the criterion for part of their threshold
payout.

Evidently their management believed that this was a key

element to their success.

It was a new program, so insufficient

history was available to test its effectiveness at this point in time.
Virtually all of the companies surveyed had a threshold level
of earnings or return that must be earned before incentive bonus
payout.

No matter how hard management worked, or met other

goals, if the shareholder did not do well, from an earnings standpoint,
then, plan participants did not benefit.

Some respondents indicated

there were complaints from their utility management that they have
too many factors affecting earnings beyond their control.
include the weather, regulatory climate, and so forth.

Examples

They indicated

their Boards look at these factors similarly to private business risks,
such as competition, product obsolescence, the economy, and so forth.
All businesses have risk of earnings loss, and aggressive
management must find ways to insulate the corporation from those
risks, utilities included.
Weightings Between Overall Corporate Performance
Criteria and Individual Performance
Companies assigning a percentage weighting factor to overall
corporate goal achievement and to individual performance objective
achievement, in general, assign a higher percentage of weighting to
overall corporate performance to individual positions higher in the
corporate chain of command.

The stated reason for this assignment
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is that the broader an individual's responsibility in an organization,
the better the understanding of corporate goals and the individual's
ability to control the overall achievement of corporate goals.
Many plans in the surveyed companies have nearly 100
percent of their incentive compensation payout for the CEO and other
top officers tied to overall corporate performance.

As the

organizational ladder is descended a smaller percentage of incentive
payout is tied to overall corporate performance and a higher
percentage is tied to individual performance, once threshold criteria
are met.

Utilizing this technique allows the pay for performance

program to stay within the bounds of controlling goal achievement
by the individual participant.
Eight of the eleven companies participating in the survey set
individual performance objectives for each plan participate to
determine how pool funds are distributed, once threshold criteria are
met.

Threshold criteria establish the level of pool funds available.
What criteria and methodology are used to establish individual

performance objectives?

This is usually done from the top down in

the organization where the CEO, top officer group, and/or the Board
of Directors of the organization establishes overall corporate
objectives.

These objectives are assigned to the appropriate senior

executives of the organization.

Senior executives, in turn, set the

objectives of officers and managers reporting to them, which, when
accomplished, will result in overall goal achievement.

This process

goes down the organizational line as far as needed to achieve the
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goal.
Actual goal achievement is reviewed and certified by the
reporting chain of command within the organization.

In some

companies there are senior officer or board compensation
committees which review and certify all goal setting to make sure
goals are set aggressively enough and in the right direction at the
beginning of the plan year.

They may also certify that the goals have

been achieved at the end of the plan year, prior to payout.
Great Falls Gas Company has their outside auditors certify that
the payouts are made according to the plan, when they complete
their year end audit of the Company.
It is important to set clear, meaningful individual performance
objectives.

Many of the companies surveyed stated that improving

the process of establishing individual performance objectives was an
on-going high priority for plan effectiveness.
Many surveyed companies have target levels of performance to
be achieved.

If targets are surpassed, most plans payout more than

100 percent for those individuals.

One plan allowed a 250 percent of

payout to the individual exceeding target levels of performance.
Other plan participants who do not meet target levels, usually must
reach set threshold levels of performance before any payout is made.
These levels are usually at least 80-85 percent of target levels to
trigger a 25-50 percent payout.
Individual performance objectives are reviewed by the
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individual achiever as frequently as necessary.

Individual objectives

are always reviewed by superiors at the end of the plan year to
determine objective achievement.

Flexibility was built into most

plans surveyed, to allow for changes in goals during the plan year, as
necessitated by a change in corporate goals.
Individual goal achievers continuously assess factors affecting
the need to change the direction of certain goals.

If corporate

strategy is changed at the top of the organization, this will likely
necessitate the need to change individual performance objectives
down the line immediately in order to achieve the new direction
objectives.

Adjustments are allowed by most plans to be made to the

individuals affected by the change so they will know what they will
have do to meet the new payout criteria and time frames.

Also,

usually some allowances are made for partial goal achievement on
the original goals.
Most plans contain a very important feature in setting
individual specific performance objectives, namely, to weight each
objective based on its importance.

Several surveyed companies

indicated without weighting a participant may concentrate on the
easier objectives and leave critical objectives till last.

This can also

be handled in an alternate way by assigning a completion date to
each objective.

This latter approach can be enhanced further by

assigning a weighting to each objective (they must all add to 100
percent), so that a higher percentage of total payout is assigned to
the more critical goals and therefore a higher level of effort is put
forth to achieve those objectives.
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Approximately half of the

surveyed companies use the weighting approach.
Most companies using individual performance objectives, set
from four to eight specific objectives for each plan participant.

One

company suggested that only two or three objectives be set for lower
level managers and supervisors so that they can focus on the
objectives better.

The fewer objectives that can be set and still get

the job done appears to be the better way to set objectives because it
is easier to focus on a few rather than many. Examples of specific
performance objectives are shown in APPENDIX 5.

Level of Plan Pavout Required to Adequately
Motivate Participants
The surveyed companies had wide variations in the amount of
cash compensations for payout.

The lowest was 6 percent and the

highest was 50 percent of base pay for target goal achievement.

The

higher the participant's position in the organization, the higher the
payout percentage of base pay for target level achievement.

Because

of the small size of the sample and the wide variation of payout
levels reported, no attempt was made in this survey analysis to come
up with an average payout level
Larger companies usually had much higher individual target
payout potentials than smaller companies.

This is demonstrated

below from AGA salary survey information gathered in the 1987
survey.

The chart is a plot of key executive positions of all 99
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companies reporting in the survey against 66 smaller companies
with revenues under $500 million per year.

Detailed summary

tables from the AGA salary survey are included in APPENDIX 6.
FIGURE 1
A Comparison Of Pay For Performance
Payout Percentages All AGA Companies
Vs. Smaller AGA Member Companies
(Under $500Million in Annual Revenues)
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Source:
The 1987 AGA Executive Salary Survey of Member Companies.
Note:
Officer Titles-Chief Ex. Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Officer (COO),
Top Legal Officer (TLegal), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Top Gas
Supply Executive (GSE), Human Resource Executive (HRE), and Top
Marketing Executive (Mkt).
Plans included in the AGA study were designed to trigger
payout at target levels.

The smaller companies survey showed that

for lower level executives the payouts in the 10-12 percent of base
pay range for target achievement, while in the larger companies they
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were slightly higher at 15 percent.

These lower payout percentages

for target goal achievement were for the marketing executives and
increased to 15 percent for CEO's of smaller companies.

They

reached near 30 percent for CEO's for the group containing the larger
companies.
The AGA survey results, including the larger companies, show a
larger spread of target payout levels between the CEO and other
executives than did the smaller company group.

Have Pav For Performance Programs Accomplished
There Corporate Objectives?
In general, survey respondents believe that their pay for
performance program is a strong tool in helping achieve corporate
objectives and that if the program is designed properly, it stretches
individual performance in the direction of corporate objectives.

The

"proof of the pudding" as stated by one plan coordinator, is when
their industry is having difficulty in achieving satisfactory results
but the company with a solid pay for performance program is doing
well, that is, they are "bucking the trend."

There were two surveyed

companies which fit this category.
One company with a strong pay for performance program has
reduced its workforce by 40 percent even though it is adding 10-15
thousand new customers each year and has not been before
regulatory authorities to seek rate relief since 1982.
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That was the

year they implemented their pay for performance program.
There is broad belief by companies who have pay for
performance programs that it has helped their organizations to
better focus in on corporate objectives and has improved individual
participant's performance.

Also, by tying compensation to overall

corporate objectives it builds team work.

It rewards participants for

a job well done, especially when tied to individual performance
objective achievement.
There is a wide spread feeling by plan participants in
companies not doing well financially that their plans need beefing up
or changed even though they may acknowledge that their segment of
the industry as a whole is not doing well at the present time.
Also if plan participants feel that a certain part of their plan
compensation is out of their control, they believe that the plan is
unfair and needs changing.

As an example, one company had part of

its threshold criteria tied to comparing its gas rates with peer group
rate levels.

It had not paid off since plan's inception.

Consequently,

there was a strong feeling by participants, that the criterion was not
fair and that it needed changing.
Maior Problems with Pay For
Performance Programs
It appears from survey respondents that the designers of pay
for performance programs should try to keep them as simple and
straight forward as possible.

If it is not clear to the plan participants
34

exactly how the plan works, there becomes suspicion and discontent
with the plan.
One company surveyed had an elaborate formula that included
the factors for threshold, group factors, individual goal weighting,
and job ranking factors all plugged into the formula.

The human

resource manager responding to the survey gave his program a high
rating for design and a much lower rating for effectiveness because
of the lack of understanding of how the program works by most plan
participants.
It seems clear from survey respondents that the more
complexities a pay for performance program contains in its design
the larger the on going communication effort required to satisfy the
questions and understanding of the plan participants.
A second important problem with performance programs is the
need to design effective, quality goals for individual achievement.
This was mentioned several times in the survey, especially by
respondents who were in the first year or two of the plan.

It takes

careful thought to construct an effective individual performance goal
which is viewed as achievable by the plan participant but, yet,
requires the employee to stretch his performance above levels
previously achieved.

Difficulty in setting specific performance

objectives for individuals was not mentioned as often by plan
respondents whose plans had been in service for several years.
Several respondents to the survey indicated that goals were too
easy to achieve in the early phase of the program. They also
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indicated that if this happens it is important to correct it quickly
because plan participants can view the incentive awards as
entitlements after receiving them for a few years without having to
appreciably stretch their performance for them.
Another problem when program design leaves allocating all or
part of the awards to the CEO or the Board based on their views of
how the employee performed.

Views can be very subjective.

One

large company responding to the survey had 25 percent of the
incentive bonus left to the discretion of the CEO based on his
judgement of how each participant performed.
viewed as unfair by some plan participants.

The practice was
Other survey

respondents also indicated that a program is more effective if
individual goals are clear, so that the participant knows exactly what
he has to accomplish to achieve his goal.
Two companies indicated problems with first line supervisors
and lower middle management plan participants who did not relate
well to corporate goals.

Both did not believe they were getting the

stretch in performance from these groups.

Some were leaning

toward having fewer individual objectives for lower level managers
so that they might better focus on their objectives.

Another

respondent thought that the payout level was too low for lower level
managers to provide the proper motivation toward the goals.

One

company was going to have focus groups of plan participants to
determine the strengths and weaknesses of the plan.

The plan would

then be redesigned to consider overcoming the weaknesses.
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One company indicated that because its plan included only job
grades eleven and higher, they had a lot of requests to raise grade
ten positions to grade eleven so they could be included in the plan.
The company solved this problem by setting policy where all job
grade changes from ten to eleven had to be approved by the CEO.
Overall, survey respondents were more likely to rate their pay
for performance programs high if corporate objectives were being
met and plan payout was occurring.

Companies which were not

doing well financially, in most cases, found respondents indicating
major problems with the structure or administration of the program.

Do Companies Design Their Own Pav
For Performance Programs?
Five of the eleven companies responding to the survey
developed their own programs, usually after visiting with other
companies as to how their programs were structured.

Two

companies used consultants to design their programs and four used a
combination of company personnel and consultants.

Even where

consultants were used to design a company's program, the company
has used in house expertise to refine and upgrade the program
during the years of use.

All survey respondents were in the process

of refining some aspect of their pay for performance programs; it
appears from the survey that pay for performance programs require
continual honing to make them work effectively under changing
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conditions.
None of the companies responding to the survey has a formal
auditing program to test the effectiveness of their pay for
performance programs.

The two companies which compare their

bottom line performance with peer group companies indicated that
their standing in the ranking with peers was the true test as to
whether their programs were effective or not.

One of these

companies was ranked very high with peers and thought its
performance plan was working very well.

The other company was

not ranked near the top with peers and thought its program was not
working.
One responding company has a group of senior officers review
the goals of each participant and they follow goal progress from goal
reports.

This helps them keep on track with corporate objective

achievement and improves the quality of individual performance
objectives.
There was only one respondent that indicated having a
problem selling the concept of pay for performance to regulatory
authorities.

The PSC would not buy the concept that incentive

awards which were based on current year ROE, was a known and
certain quantity, even though incentive pay had been earned four
years in a row by plan recipients.

In the most current rate

application the regulatory authority has challenged the company to
set up an auditing program so it can be demonstrated how the pay
for performance program is benefitting the ratepayer.
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One company used the consulting firm which designed their
program as an expert witness to sell the program to the Commission.
Other respondents indicated that there was no problem because it
was relatively easy to sell the Commission on the concept that tieing
pay to performance enhances overall effectiveness and is the "best
bang for the buck" for the consumer.

Three respondents indicated

that had yet to test their incentive pay for performance programs
with their regulatory authorities.
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CHAPTER V
STUDY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions
The following conclusions are drawn from research and reflect
the experiences-both good and poor-of other companies and their
pay for performance programs.

They also serve as guidelines for

GFGC
1.)

Sending out survey forms to selected companies to gain

information is not an effective method of collecting data about
successful pay for performance programs.

The telephone survey,

which Great Falls Gas Company ended up using, is a very effective
method to collect this information.

It is important that the most

knowledgeable individual about pay for performance is contacted to
gain the most reliable information.

In this case it was the human

resource manager or officer of each company.
It is believed that a sufficient number of other company's pay
for performance programs were reviewed to gain the knowledge to
effectively update Great Falls Gas Company's pay for performance
program.
2.)

This study confirmed the importance of the need of utility

management, today, to adapt to change.

A prime way to gain

flexibility to successfully deal with this changing world is through
the development of an effective compensation program, which leads
management and the company as a whole in the direction of strategic
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objectives.

An effective program which ties pay to performance can

be the answer to many of these organizational needs.
Consultant and academic research is beginning to confirm that
a greater correlation between pay and performance is occurring
more frequently throughout the business world today than just a few
years ago.
Gas utility companies reported the following advantages of
their pay for performance programs:
a. Directs management focus on key results areas of the
company, which will improve bottom line performance.
b. Helps build team effort to effective corporate performance.
c. Helps an organization change directions rapidly, which is
critical in a constantly changing business environment.
d. Assists in the ability to retain and attract talented
employees.
e. Is a program, if designed and implemented correctly, links
pay to performance.
3.) Approximately 40 percent of the utilities reporting in the
1987 AGA Salary Survey had pay for performance programs, at least
for their officers and many including middle managers and
supervisors.

As company size decreases, fewer companies have such

programs.
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It was not found that smaller companies, similar in size to
GFGC, had tailored programs more suitable to GFGC, as originally
hypothesized.

Smaller companies had more modest pay for

performance programs, which in many cases appeared to be less
effective in motivating participants.

Larger companies had better

designed plans, which produced better overall results.
Great Falls Gas has had a program since 1982 and sees no
logical reason why other small, as well as larger utilities, should not
have such programs.

The same proportional benefits should accrue

to small utility shareholders, as well as to larger ones from pay for
performance programs.
4.) A common thread of almost all surveyed companies was
that they are looking to enhance their existing programs or enlarge
their pay for performance programs to cover a larger portion of the
management team.

Three companies surveyed are looking to expand

pay for performance to their entire work force in the next three
years.
5.) All companies surveyed used threshold criteria tied to
overall corporate performance to determine the amount of funds
available in the payout pool.

Threshold criteria was usually tied in

large part to return on equity in some manner.
Companies who use earnings as the threshold used various
criteria but the two most popular methods were:
A.

Comparing actual returns of the company with the Allowed
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Rate of Return set by the governing regulatory authority.

This

return was in most cases was ROE, but if the company had other
companies under its ownership umbrella, it may use return on
assets.
B.

Comparing actual returns with a pre-approved profit plan or

budgeted controllable expenses.
Minimum payouts (about 50%) in many plans began when 8085 percent of the return levels set as the target objective are
achieved and usually 100 percent payout is available for distribution
when 100 percent of the target is achieved.

Most plans also payout

110-150 percent of target incentive if higher levels of earnings
above target are reached.
6.) Over half of the companies responding to the survey
assigned a percentage weighting factor to overall corporate goal
achievement and part to individual performance objective
achievement.

In general, they assign a higher percentage of

weighting to overall corporate performance to positions higher in the
corporate chain of command.

The reason for this assignment is that

the broader an individual's responsibility, the better understanding
of overall corporate objectives, and the more direct influence he has
in the overall achievement of corporate objectives.
7.) Many plans in the surveyed companies have nearly 100
percent of their incentive compensation payout for the CEO and other
top officers tied to overall corporate performance.

As the

organizational ladder is descend, a higher percentage of payout is
43

tied to individual objective achievement, and a lesser amount to
overall corporate performance.
8.)

It is important that all participants in the program realize,

that the company must perform well before individuals can do well.
This brings home the realization that it is bottom line results that
count for payoffs and not just working hard without looking ahead to
the benefits to the total organization.

Said another way it is "output

that counts, not input."
Several respondents indicated that there were numerous inhouse discussions that utilities were different because utility returns
are tied to weather, while other types of businesses were not.

It

appears that utility Boards are not "buying the argument" that
utilities are different because all plans surveyed were tied to
threshold earnings levels.
Several respondents indicated that their Board's views were
that utility earnings can be somewhat insulated from severe weather
impacts by proper design of rates, aggressively seeking industrial
loads, which are not weather sensitive, plus diversify into businesses
with non-weather sensitive earnings.
9.) The methodology used to establish individual performance
objectives usually starts from the top of the organization down.

The

CEO, top officer group, and/or Board of Directors of an organization
establishes overall corporate objectives.

These objectives are then

assigned to the appropriate senior executives of the organization.
Senior executives in turn set the objectives of officers and managers
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reporting to them and so on down the line to the level necessary for
goal achievement.
The success of pay for performance is no doubt dependent on
the setting of corporate objectives in the direction which will produce
effective results.

If ineffective corporate objectives are established

and achieved the outcome will be still be unsatisfactory.

This

emphasizes the importance of sound strategic planning in order to
establish effective corporate goals.
10.) It is important to set clear, meaningful individual
performance objectives.

For good motivation, it is also important

that plan participants buy into their performance objectives.

They

should believe they are achievable and are worthy of achievement.
All companies surveyed, stated that improving the process of
establishing individual performance objectives was an on-going high
priority for plan effectiveness.

Companies were more comfortable

writing performance objectives after the plan had been in effect for
several years.

Companies with new plans showed more concern

about writing effective individual performance objectives.
Another very important feature in setting individual specific
performance objectives is to weight each objective based on its
importance.

Without weighting, a participant may concentrate on

those more easily attained, and, perhaps, less important, until last.
Designers of pay for performance programs should try to keep them
as simple and straight forward as possible.

If it is not clear to the

plan participants exactly how the plan works, there becomes
45

suspicion and discontentment with the plan.
11.) One of Great Falls Gas Company's prime questions going
into this study was: Are payout levels for its own plan participants at
a high enough level to get them to stretch their performance?
Company lower level managers and officers are at a payout level of 6
and 7.5 percent of base pay respectively.

Both secondary research

and the gas utility survey results pointed towards minimum payouts
at the 12-15 percent of base pay levels to adequately motivate plan
participants.
CEO's incentive compensation levels were in the range of 25-50
percent of base pay and most plans tapered the incentive bonuses
down for lower job grades to the minimum levels indicated above.
Larger companies usually set higher incentive bonuses as a percent
of base pay than smaller companies.

It is not clear from this study

why this latter phenomena occurs because smaller companies have
lower base pay for comparable job title positions than larger
companies.

Lower base pay would result in smaller dollar payout

even by setting the same percentage of base pay.
Several responding companies indicated that in determining
the reasonableness of an individual's salary level with the
marketplace, incentive pay is added to base pay in making such
comparisons.

Base pay with incentive pay should be a minimum of

5-10 percent above comparative marketplace midpoint base
compensation levels to have an effective program.

Base pay without

incentive pay will usually be 5-10 percentage points below midpoint
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market salary levels.
The cost or payout of an effective corporate pay for
performance program usually ranges from 5-10 percent of total
payroll.

This is only paid in good earnings years because payout is

based on meeting set earnings threshold criteria.
12.) A problem with pay for performance programs which
leaves the allocation of all or part of the individual performance
awards to the CEO or the Board, based on their view of how the
employee performed, can cause suspicion by plan participants
because the decision is subjective.
It is better to have all performance criteria clearly defined so
that plan participants know exactly what has to be done in order to
achieve payout.
13.)

Two survey respondents indicated problems with first

line supervisors and lower middle management plan participants not
relating well to corporate goals.

Both did not believe they were

getting the improvement in performance from these groups to the
extent of justifying incentive bonuses actually paid.

To try to correct

this situation companies are leaning toward fewer individual
objectives, two to four,

for lower level managers, so that they might

better focus on their objectives.

Another respondent to the survey

thought that the payout level set for first line supervisors was too
low and suggested raising it to at least 10 to 12 percent of base pay.
Since lower level supervisors frequently have a larger part of
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their overall job responsibilities tied to routine work, many
companies use their more established merit pay and job standards
systems to evaluate performance in addition to setting incentive
bonuses for specific performance objective achievement for this
group.
14.)

None of the companies responding to the survey have

formal auditing programs to test the effectiveness of their pay for
performance programs.

Two companies think the use of peer group

rankings of ROE is a true test on program effectiveness, i.e., if they
rank high its working and vice versa.
15.)

Great Falls Gas was the only company included in the

survey statistics that indicated having a problem selling the concept
of pay for performance to regulatory authorities.

Recommendations
After reviewing the results of the secondary research findings
and the gas company's utility information survey, it appears that
Great Falls Gas has good basic design of its pay for performance
program.

It has clear threshold criteria, based on ROE, to establish

the payout pool.

It has a higher percentage of payout tied to overall

corporate objectives for top officers.

Higher percentage of payout is

tied to individual performance objective achievement further down
the organization ladder.

Individual performance objectives are

weighted based on their importance.
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The study results indicate that the payout level for lower level
managers and supervisors, in Great Falls Gas' program are set too
low.

Payout for these participants should be raised from the 6-7.5

percent levels to the 12-15 percent range in order to provide the
proper performance motivation!

It also appears that the CEO should

receive payout at 25 percent of base pay or higher, for achieving
target objectives, while other lower level positions should taper
down to the 12-15 percent range, as minimum pay levels.
The number of individual performance objectives for lower
level managers and supervisors should be limited to two to four
goals, so they can better focus on these goals.

The merit pay plan

should be continued to evaluate the routine portion of lower level
supervisors and managers performance until more effective
methodology is developed.
The findings from this study are convincing to Great Falls Gas
management that continuing to hone and expand its pay for
performance program is in the best interest of the shareholder.

But

expansion of the program should be done carefully and a step at a
time so that full evaluation of the program can be made as it
progresses.

Honing of its existing program is a continuous process

because of the changing marketplace and the changing needs of its
employees from a motivational viewpoint.
If a utility has experienced several bad earnings years in a row
due to weather, this should not necessarily mean the plan should be
changed.

If the plan is deemed fair by plan participants in good
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earnings years, it may well be a sound program in poor earnings
years too.

A company should not be too hasty in plan changes before

management has a chance to change conditions to be successful
through goal achievement.

It may take two to three years to show

real progress in poor business climate conditions.
Overall, Great Falls Gas Company believes it achieved its
information goals in this study, as set out in Chapter I.
There is need for further study on how pay for performance
programs can be established for the remainder of the work force.
Plus further study needs to be made to see if there are other forms
of compensation, other that cash, which might be as effective or more
effective in motivating employees to higher performance levels.
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APPENDIX 1

A COPY OF GREAT FALLS GAS COMPANY'S

1987 PAY FOR PERFORMANCE

MANAGEMENT INCENTIVE PLAN
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Great Falls Gas Company & Subsidiaries
Pay for Performance Plan
F 1988
A.I.
ELIGIBLE PARTICIPANTS
PROGRAM

TYPE OF

Group A
Larry D. Geske, President & CEO
) Fixed
Warren L. Robinson, Sr. Vice President) Variable
&CTO

Group B
William J. Quast, Vice President
& Treas./Sec.
)
Sheila Rice, Vice President Marketing

)

Variable

Group C
John Allen, Corp. Attorney & Asst. Sec. )
Lee Conwell, Dir. Human Resources
)
Gerald Dasinger, Dir. Corp Taxes & Acct.)
George Malin, Asst. V.P. Operations
)
Gary Parker, Asst. V.P. Administration )
Earl Terwilliger, Mgr. Cust. Acct. &
)
Admin. Services.
)

Variable

Pay for performance proceeds will be allocated on the basis of pay
for performance criteria established by the Board of Directors and
Senior Management of the Company (See Schedule I).
A II.

PLAN COMMENCEMENT

The pay for performance program of Great Falls Gas Company will be
50% funded if the five year average on return on equity is greater
than or equal to 12.5%. If the return on common equity is greater
than or equal to 11.0% in the current fiscal year, the pay for
performance plan will be funded by 50%. Either portion of the plan
can be funded exclusive of the other portion of the plan. The rate of
return on equity is to be based and calculated after tax.
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The determination of the qualification of funding for the pay
for performance plan will be determined by Arthur Young &
Company of Denver Colorado at the end of the fiscal year.
The earned pay for performance dollars, if any, will be paid to
a participant on a prorated basis if the participant is employed for
more than nine (9) months of the plan year. The plan however, does
not create a contractual obligation with the employees of Great Falls
Gas Company. The Plan may be continued, discontinued, and/or
modified at the discretion of the Board of Directors.
A. III.

FUNDING LEVEL -- GROUP A

The pay for performance plan will be based on 16% of base salaries
as the minimum funding level and would increase by 1% of base
salaries for each 1% increase in the fiscal year return on equity over
the PSC allowed rate of return, up to a maximum of 26.5% of base
salaries.
If only one of the fund criteria is met (fiscal year or five
year average), the one qualifying the funding is used to determine
the pay for performance payout. If both criteria are met, the highest
return is used in determining the funding level.
A. IV.

FUNDING LEVEL -- GROUP B

The pay for performance plan will be based on 10% of base salaries
as the minimum funding level and would increase by 1% of base
salaries for each 1% increase in the fiscal year return on equity over
the PSC allowed rate of return, up to a maximum of 17.5% of base
salaries.
If only one of the fund criteria is met (fiscal year or five
year average), the one qualifying the funding is used to determine
the pay for performance payout. If both criteria are met, the highest
return is used in determining the funding level.
A. V.

FUNDING LEVEL - GROUP C

The pay for performance plan will be based on 7.5% of base salaries
as the minimum funding level and would increase by 1% of base
salaries for each 1% increase in the fiscal year return on equity over
the PSC allowed rate of return, up to a maximum of 12% of base
salaries.
If only one of the fund criteria is met (fiscal year or five
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year average), the one qualifying the funding is used to determine
the pay for performance payout. If both criteria are met, the highest
return is used in determining the funding level.

SCHEDULE I
GREAT FALLS GAS COMPANY & SUBSIDIARIES
PAY FOR PERFORMANCE DISTRIBUTION CRITERIA
PAYOUT SCHEDULE
The pay for performance funds will be approved and paid out to
participants at the first regularly scheduled meeting of the Board of
Directors following the annual audit of the books of the company.
The funds will be distributed in accordance with the following
guidelines and with the individual performance rating being
determined by the Board of Directors and Senior Management.
The pay for performance fund will be calculated using the base
Compensation of the participants in the plan. Distribution of the
funds will be based on a fixed percentage of the fund as outlined
below.
Incentive
Group
Description

Factor
Distribution
Factor
Weight
Rate

A

President & CEO Corporate

A

Senior ViceCorporate
President & CFO Individual*

40%

Vice President
Treasurer/Sec.

Corporate
Individual*

20%

Vice President
Marketing

Corporate
Individual*

20%

B

B

C

Asst. VicePresident Admin.
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100%

55%
45%
60%

50%
80%

Corporate
individual*

50%
80%

20%

18%
80%

C

Asst. ViceOperations

Corporate
Individual*

C

General Office
Manager

Corporate
Individual*

20%

Corporate
Attorney

Corporate
Individual*

20%

Director of Corp. Corporate
Taxes & Accting. Individual*

20%

C

C

C

20%
80%

18%

16%
80%
16%
80%

Director of
Corporate
20%
Human Resources
Individual*

16%
80%
16%
80%

*Based on special objectives approved by the President, each
year.
( S E E ATTACHMENT 1 FOR LISTING OF INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES')
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APPENDIX 2

A SUMMARY OF UTILITY
SURVEY RESULTS
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Results of Great Falls Gas Company's Survey of Other Utilities Pay For Performance Programs
5/16/88
Q1. A.) Does your company have a pay for performance program
Responses From 17 surveys sent out:
11 yes.
2 No
4 No response
Q1.B.) Please describe the general structure of your pay for performance plan
Threshold Qualification for plan payout
Specific Performance for Actual Payout
Co. 1
5 year rolling Average ROE-50%
Current Year ROE
-50%
(ROE threshold set @1.25% below
PSC allowed ROE)=88%of allowed ROE
President 100% Based on threshold criteria
Each additional 1% ROE over threshold

Level of Payout- % Pay

18% of actual sal. paid
1% additional bonus

Sr. V.P.

40% Based on threshold-60% spec. pert. obj.
Each additional 1% ROE

15% of actual sal. paid
same as president

V.P.

20% Based on threshold -80% spec. perf. obj.
Each additional 1% ROE over threshold

10% of actual sal. paid
1% additional bonus

mgrs &
Key Staff

Same as V. P.
Same as V. P.

7.5% of actual sal. paid
1% additional bonus

CD
Current Year ROE
-25%
Supvrs
25% Based on threshold ROE
Specific Performance Object-75%
75% Based on Spec. Perf. Objectives
Q1.B.) Please describe the general structure of your pay for performance plan (Continued)
Threshold Qualification for plan payout
Specific Performance for Actual Payout
Co. 2

Must Achieve min. of 80% of ROE
Stated in Approved Profit Plan
80 % = 50% Payout
85 % - 62.5% Payout
90 % - 75% Payout
100 % - 100% Payout
105 % - 112.5% Payout
110 % - 120% Payout Maximum

1.50%
4.50%
Level of Payout- % Pay

Payout based with weighting of:
Current Year ROE
=70%
Ranking of Their Retail Rate
level with other Regional util. rates=30%
Chrm-CEO
Vice Chrm
EX. V.P.
Sr. V.P.
V.P.
Ast. V.P.
RegionMgr
Sr. Mgrs-Lrg Areas
Grd 13 Dept Hds.
Grd 12 Mgrs-Dir
Grd 11 Mgrs.-Sen Stff(sml dept)

50% of Base Pay
45" "
40" "
37.5" "
35" "
32.5" "
30" "
25" "
20"

"

15" "
12.5 " "

Co. 3

Must Achieve min. of PSC allowed ROE

20 Controllable Expense ltems-50%
Return on Total Assets(PSC Allow)=50%
Group
Scale of payout If Controllable Exp is a<
Bonus
100% Budgeted Exp. =0% Payout
inclds
95% Budgeted Exp. >1.0%
Officers* 90% Budgeted Exp. >2.0%
Dept Heads- 85% Budgeted Exp. >2.5%
Supvrs.
80% Budgeted Exp. >3.0%
Scale of Payout if Return on Total Asset
PSC Allowed Return on Assets -0%
1% Over PSC Allowed
>1.0%
1.5% Over PSC Allowed
-1.5%
2.0% Over PSC Allowed
>2.0%
2.5% Over PSC Allowed
=2.5%
3.0% Over PSC Allowed
=3.0%

Q1.B.) Please describe the general structure of your pay for performance plan (Continued)
Threshold Qualification for plan payout
Specific Performance for Actual Payout
Co. 4
Threshold -must earn PSC allowROE
8 Employees Elgible-8 officers, mgrs,key staff
CEO and two Board Members(one inside-one ou
determine who gets how much, determination is
strictly subjective based on how they saw each
participant's performance in prior year.
Co. 5

Compensation at risk is two pronged1. Long Term Incentive earned over 3 years,
stock options-tied to corporate ROE peer group
ranking-higher then 25 percentile 50% payout,
above 50th percentile-100% payout
above 75th quartile(150% Payout)
Stock options awarded to individuals as they
deem performance warrants
2. Annual Cash Bonus tied to meeting specific
performance objectives for each particiapant which enhance the
Company's bottom line performancetop 10 salary grades elgible down to Asst. VP
Job Grade titles elgibl
Thres.
-1- COB/Pres/C
15
2-4 V. Chrm/Pr
15
5-6 EX. Vp/Sr.V
15
7-8 Sr VP/VP
12
9-10 Mp
10

Line Positions-cash bonus
Target
Max (%
35
70
35
60
30
55
25
45
35
20

Q1.B.) Please describe the general structure of your pay for performance plan (Continued)

Threshold for plan payout qualification
Company No.6 Current year Utility Rate of Return Compared
to Profit Plan ROE
Two criteria
1)Return on Equity less inflation rate-60%
2)Ranking with peer group companies of
ratio of customers/employees-40% weighting

Specific Performance for Actual Payout

Level of Payout- % Pay

Min Payout Level-67% if Profit Plan ROE
less inflation rate is met
Target Payout Level-100% if Profit Plan met
Max. Payout-150%
% payout by job title not obtained

Company No. 7 Weighted on 3 factors
15% on Meeting ROE of Parent Co
45% on "
" " DistbrCo.
40% on Meeting individual specific perf. object

Guideline Bonus Amounts
% Base
Division Heads
Executive Levels 17 and Above
Management Levels 14-16 and PAT 8
Management Levels 9-13

alary
12%
10
6
4

Min
Target
Max
50%
100%
150%
The above % apply to Parent
and Distbr. Co. goal achievem'
Min. set at budget levels
Individual achievement of
specific performance object
ives is based on individual
performance rating
Perf. Rating % Payout
5
100%
6
150%
7
200%
8-9
250%

Company No.8 Threshold based on ranking of company with
10 peer group companies-each year Board of
Directors decides min. ranking to qualify for
incentive program-This year Company must
rank 4th highest of peer group in order for
program to trigger to min. levels
last year were at bottom of peer group co.s
no pay out
top of peer group-150% payout
2nd
100%
3rd
50
4th
25

Payout is based on:
Peer Group Ranking-50%
Individual Goal achievement-50%
Individual Goal Achievement
Min Rating-25% payout
up to
Max. Exceptional performance-150% payout
Individual may meet his goals even if Dept
did not meet its goals-President decides if each person
did or not achieve their goals as final say

Company can be losing money and individual
can still receive some payout
Program applies to Sr. V.P.'s and above

% Payout of base pay not available

Q1.B.) Please describe the general structure of your pay for performance plan (Continued)

Threshold for plan payout qualification
Company No.9 Must achieve ROE threshold set level
weighting of award- 60% ROE
-40% on controllable O & M
Pool dollars determined for ROE and Control O&M By:
Min payout-85% of target
Target100%
Max110%

Company No10

3 year roiling ROE set at PSC allow ROE
23 executives elgibie for program- participants
selected by president

Specific Performance for Actual Payout
There are 60 people in program
awards based on individual achievement of

Payout target awards
CEO-25%
Excutives Direct Reporting to Pres-20%
Officers reporting to Exec.s-15%
Mid Managers-10%
pool is 10% of aggregate salaries
Maximum award is 25 % of base pay
awards are made based on achievement of
individual goal achievement
only information available

Company No 11 Bonus program is tied to major corporations
management incentive program
50% weighting to consolidated corp.'s ROE
50%
"
" Individual performance

payout to individual
ROE-3% of payroll
Individual performance-3% max.
Parent company has been very depressed
in earnings for many years, not much payout

APPENDIX 2
Results of Utility Survey
5/16/88
Professional Paper
L. D. Geske
Q. 2. Why did your Company establish your pay for
performance

program?

Summary of responses:

Wanted to establish a pay system

which:
a. Directed individual effort of officers and managers to key
results areas of the Company to improve bottom line results.
b. Wanted a program to build a team effort to improve
performance
c. Wanted a program to help change direction of the
organization with a constantly changing business.

Q.3.

How long have you had your pay for performance

program?

Number of Responses
1 year-

2

2-5 years-

3

6-10 years-

4

over 10 years-

1

no response

1

median Length of Time Since Inception= 5 years
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Q.4.

Do you set individual or group performance

objectives?

Individual

Group

Both

2

8

1

Q.5.

Could you please provide at least four (4) examples of

individual

or group

performance

objectives?

Response: Several examples were sent in and they are included
in the Appendix of this report.

Q.6.

How frequent are performance objectives reviewed for

change?

Quarterly semiannual
1

annually
10*

•Four responses: If a change in department or corporate
strategy changes during the year, specific performance objectives are
changed at that time.

Q.7. A.) How do you measure whether an individual has
achieved all or a portion of his or her objectives?
Responses: An employee may receive partial credit for an
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objective it the supervisor so chooses.

Objectives are hard and fast

and it is relatively simple to determine if objectives have been
achieved.

B.) Do you weight each objective?
Responses:

Q.8.

Weighted

Not Weighted

5

6

Who is included in your pay for performance program?
Responses: See Q.l. Responses too.

Senior Officers Only All Officers Officers.Managers Off..Mgrs.Supvrs
2

Q.9.

1

4

4

Why have you limited your program to only these

individuals

listed

above

Responses:
Have expanded program
which used to only include
top officers.

Other Responses:
Has included same individuals
for over 10 years since
incept.
8*
Will expand to supvr. level next
year.
•Three responses: Plan on expanding pay for performance to
entire work-force in near future.
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Q.10.

How do you tie pay for performance objective

achievement into compensation?

Response included in

responses to Q.l.

Q.ll.

Has your program accomplished your overall

corporate objectives for establishing the program?
Responses:
Company No. 1-It has accomplished most of our objectives.

I

believe we may need to raise the level of potential pay out for
supervisors and managers to make the incentive more motivating to
participants.

We want to expand the program to all employees

within 3 years.

Officers and Managers take the same risks as

shareholders; i.e. regulatory, weather, and the economy.

Supervisors

only take 25% of shareholder risk the other 75% is tied to their
specific performance objectives which are paid if achieved, whether
the Company earns its return or not.
Company No. 2- The 30% weighting tied to comparing our rates
with other utilities in the region is a comparison which is difficult to
make and plan participants feel it is out of their control.

We are

looking for other criteria which may be more meaningful to the
company and participants.
Plan are designed so that participants take the same risks as
shareholders, such as, regulatory, weather, and the economy.

They

believe this is the way it should be; i.e. if the shareholder benefits,
68

shareholders, such as, regulatory, weather, and the economy.

They

believe this is the way it should be; i.e. if the shareholder benefits,
then they should too, and vice versa.
Company No.3- Our Company is a small part of the total
consolidated corporation.

The return on assets 50% weighting we

feel is out of our hands since corporate adds and deletes to capital
additions.

We feel we do not have control of this portion of the

program.

Plan participants take the same risks as the shareholder.

If the shareholder benefits plan participants benefit if 20
controllable expense item criteria is met total payout occurs.
Company No. 4- The granting of the bonus awards is strictly up
to the compensation committee of the Board and I'll admit is very
subjective.

I'm looking for a more formal plan and will look forward

to receiving a copy of your study.
Company No. 5- Yes, the proof of the pudding is that our ROE is
at the top of our peer group companies.

In the cash bonus program,

we need to set more specific performance criteria for each
participant for more accurate determination of goal achievement.
Company No. 6.- plan has been in place only one year. There
were several bugs in the plan on implementation which are now
being worked out. It has for manager level on up.

Also the CEO has

discretion to change to a particular employee based on how the CEO
values each individual's performance.

This discretion can equate to

up to 25% increase or decrease in individual's performance.
Company No. 7.- The results at the supervisory level have been
disappointing in that we don't feel they relate to overall corporate
goals very well and therefore have not seen measurable
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improvements in their performance.
Company No.9.- Program has increased focusing in on corporate
goals and has improved individual participant's performance.

Our

industry segment is going through tremendous change and we're still
struggling.

People now know that they have to produce or there's no

big payoff.
Company No.10.- Prior to this time the Board made the decision
as to how incentive awards were made.

Now corporate goals are met

and personal objectives must be achieved too, for payout.
Company No. 11.-No. Incentive levels too low.

Q.12.

What are the true strengths of your program?
Summary of Responses: Corporate objectives are met and

employees have bought into the program.
We are working more as a team.

We are more successful.

One of the performance objectives

is that ROE must rank well among our peer group companies; since
our earnings are the highest of the group I would say we are
successful.
Goals are set annually top to bottom, more cohesive organization;
more challenges to all members of management.
Our program has only been in place for a year so its difficult to
say whether its successful yet.
Reward managers for jobs well done.
Shoves decision responsibility down the organization for more
effective decision making.

We have also implemented zero based
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budgeting in our organization which has kept us out of filing for rate
increases since 1982.

Our work force has decreased from 2500

employees to 1650 but are still adding 10-15 thousand new
customers per year.

Our whole management team is geared to the

thinking that there is always a better way to get the job done, thanks
to pay for performance.
Focuses in on Corporate and individual goals and performance.
Tightens the tie of individual performance to corporate
objectives.

Q.13.

What are the weaknesses of your program?
Responses:
Co. 1- see responses in Q.ll
2- Much upward pressure was experienced to upgrade

grade 10 employees into the program since it starts at grade 11.
Now the Chairman of the Board must approve all grade changes for
10 to 11, which has solved the problem.
Co. 3-see responses in Q.ll
Co. 4-"

"

"

"

Co. 5-"

"

"

"

Co. 6- Concerned of the cost of the program which equates to a
max of 1 % of earnings.

Plus the way our pension benefits program

is written it may run pension costs up too fast.
Co. 7- Incentive program at the supervisory level is not
effective; they do not seem to have a grasp of overall corporate goals
and the meaning of return to shareholder.

Also, need better quality

goals for all; we now have 4-7 for each participant, I believe 2-3 for
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first line supervisors might focus their attention better.
Co. 8- Very difficult to get agreement on fairness of goals and
payoff between our 6 different companies, there is a lot of bickering
about how unfair some goals are compared to their tough goals.
Many don't fully understand the program which causes more friction.
I believe our program is too complicated and needs to be simplified
and better communicated as to how it works.
Co. 9- Communications difficult. Lower level managers think it
is an entitlements program; doesn't seem to be a strong enough tie of
pay to performance.

We are setting up focus groups to get feedback

as to what the strengths and weaknesses are from participants so
program can be improved.

Some feedback indicates that they do not

fully understand how the program works, so we may need to do a
better job of explaining the program to participants.
Co. 10- Plan only two years old, some worried about the cost of
the program.
Co. 11- No response to this question.

Q.14.

If you were just setting up your program today what

would

you do differently?

Responses: Answers the same as Q.ll outlining weaknesses.

Q.15.

On a scale of 1 to 10 where would your rank your

pay for performance program( with 10 being the highest
and best rating)?
Responses:
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Co. No. 1-7 rating
" "

2- 8 "

" "

3- 5 "

"

"

4-No rating given

"

"

5-No rating given

Co. No. 6- on enthusiasm an 8 or 9 rating, on other areas the
program is too new to rate (1 yr).
Co. No. 7- I would rate our program an 8 w/o first line
supervisors and only a 5 rating with them in the program.
Co. No. 8-A 5 rating.
Co. No. 9-Rating on the design of program=8-9
Rating on the administration of plan=5-6
Co. No. 10 & 11- No rating given

Q.16.

Has your Company developed its own Pay for

Performance program or what was the source of its
origination?
Responses:
Developed own program

Used Consultants

5

2

Used Both

4*

* Three responses: Used consultants initially to set up program
and have been trying to streamline it in house.

Q.17.

Did you use the aid of an outside consultant to

establish your program?

If so who was the consultant?

Response to first part of this question is shown in Q.16.
Consultants Used:

Booz-Allen ( Lou Brandieze)
73

Hewlett Corp.
Jim Teevan-private consultant(Seattle)

Q.18.

Do you have a measurement system, which

determines how cost effective your program is, such as,
comparing the payroll cost of your program with bottom
line

improvement?
Responses:

Not at this time Yes
7*

4**

*Co. No. 1- We have set up an auditing task group to develop
the criteria for determining the success of the pay for performance
program.
** Co.s No. 5 & 8- We feel the comparison with our peer group
ROE is a good indication of how effective the program is; i. e.
compensation dollars spent on at risk incentive pay, returns to
shareholder many times over.
Co. No. 7-Have a group of senior managers who review goals
of each participant from goal reports to check progress of goal
achievement.
Co. No. 9- Board must approve targets, plus we review how
we did as a whole group.

Q.19. Have you sold the concept of pay for performance to
your Public Utility Commission for rate making purposes?
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Responses:
Company No. 1- The PSC allowed half of our bonus in the cost
of service which was tied to the rolling 5 yr. average of ROE, but
denied the other half tied only to the current year's ROE.

In our most

recent case they allowed all of the pay for performance incentive pay
but warned us that next rate case we would have to fully justify all
of it as to how it benefitted the rate payers.

That is why we have set

up an auditing task force to develop the audit criteria.
Co. No. 2. PSC is aware of the program but are just testing the
concept.
Co. No. 3. Program is new and untested with PSC.
Co. No. 4. No response to this question.
Co. No. 5. FERC has no problem with program- one state
Commission is currently having problems with understanding our
long term stock option program.
Co. No. 6. Our's is a new program and has not been presented to
PSC's.
Co. No. 7. Had no problem selling program to PSC because it
enhances our overall effectiveness and its the best bang for the buck.
Co. No.8. Have had no problem with regulatory approvals.
Co. No.9. Program was reviewed in 1984 by PSC, we had the
consultant testify to the merits of the program; since then no
problems from regulators.
Co.'s No. 10 & 11. No response to this question.
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APPENDIX 3

A LISTING OF GAS UTILITIES PARTICIPATING IN

THE GAS UTILITY SURVEY
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APPENDIX 3

Listing of Gas Utility Companies
Who Responded To This Survey

1. ARKLA
2. Carnigie Natural Gas Company
3. Citizens Gas Company
4.

Consumers Power Company

5. Gas Company of New Mexico
6. Great Falls Gas Company
7.

Kansas Public Service Company

8. Michigan Gas Utility
9. Michigan Gas Utility
10. Southwest Gas Corporation
11. TRANSCO
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APPENDIX 4

SOLICITATION COVER LETTER AND

UTILITY SURVEY FORM
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$Date

APPENDIX 4

Name
Title
Address
Addressl
City
Dear Namel:
Great Falls Gas Company has had an executive and managerial Pay for
Performance Program since 1982, two years ago we extended it to include first
line supervisory personnel. We are continually looking for information to
make our program more effective. This survey is an attempt to accomplish this
objective.
We are surveying two dozen gas utility companies who have Pay for Performance
programs, so that we might adopt the most effective methods and techniques
found by other's experience.
We will consolidate our survey findings into a report which we would be happy
to share with participants of this study. All corporate names will be kept
confidential and the information will be consolidated and tabularized as much
as possible. We will list the companies who have participated in the study.
We are thanking you in advance for your participation and look forward to
receiving your response and reviewing your program. If you have questions
about the survey, please call me (406 761-7100).
We would appreciate the return of the completed survey form by May 6, 1988. A
pre-paid envelope is enclosed for your convenience. A copy of the finished
report will be sent to you by mid June 1988.
Sincerely,

Larry D. Geske
President and CEO
/caj
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Suruey Form
Pay For Performance
Pay for performance is defined as a compensation program
which sets individual performance objectives for indiuidual
supervisors, managers and officers of the company and are paid
additional compensation for achieving those objectives. If you
need additional space please attach additional sheets and refer
to survey question number.
I. Does your company have a pay for performance program? If
so would you please describe or include a copy of program
description?

2. UJhy did your Company establish your pay for performance
program?

3. Horn long have you had your pay for performance program?
4. Do you set individual or group performance objectives? If
group how have you set up your groups (who is included)?
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5. UJhat is the basic corporate criteria used in setting indiuidual
or group performance objectiues? Could you please prouide at
least four (4) representatiue examples for corporate
objectiues( such as return on equity, customers / employee) and
four for specific indiuidual or group performance objectiues
(performance objectiues set specifically for their job or group
achieuement)?

6. How frequent are performance objectiues reuiewed with the
indiuidual by superior(s)?

7. How do you measure whether an indiuidual has achieued all
or a portion of his or her objectiues (do you weight each
objectiue)? Could you please prouide eiiamples?

81

8. Who is included in your pay for performance program? Would
you please list them by job title and include the % of their base
pay which is at risk (amount tied to specific performance
objectiues)?
Indiuiduals included, by job title

% Base Pay Tied To Perf.
Objectiues

9. Why haue you limited your program to only these indiuiduals
listed aboue?

10. How do you tie pay for performance objectiue achieuement
into compensation (i.e. is part of the at risk compensation tied
to ouerall corporate performance, such as return on equity and
part to specific indiuidual performance objectiues)? Please
state the % of compensation tied to ouerall corporate objectiues
uersus % tied to indiuidual performance objectiues for each
indiuidual or group.
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11. Has your program accomplished your ouerall corporate
objectiues for establishing the program? Please elaborate as to
why you think it has or has not accomplished corporate
objectiues?

12. What are the true strengths of your program?

13. UJhat are the weaknesses of your program? Briefly state
why they are weaknesses.

14. If you were just setting up your program today what would
you do differently?

15. On the scale shown where would you rank your Company's
Pay For Performance Program for effectiueness? (please circle
your choice)
Worst 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Best
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16. Has your Company deueloped its ouin Pay For Performance
program or UJhat was the source of its origination?

17. Did you use the aid of an outside consultant to establish
your program? If so who was the consultant?

18. Do you haue a measurement system, which determines how
cost effectiue your program is, such as, comparing the payroll
cost of your program with bottom line improuement?

19. Haue you sold the concept of pay for performance to your
Public Utility Commission for rate making purposes?
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APPENDIX 5

EXAMPLES OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES BY THREE COMPANIES
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DEPARTMENT HEAD
FLBBT 6 FACILITIES
1988 GOALS

STRATEGY

METHOD OP MEASUREMENT

1.A.

Evaluate all available customers,
employees, and system design
Information to determine future
needs for facility locations.

1 A .1 ,

Detailed report dovotoped
by 5/1/811.

1.5.

Anaylze space and uso require
ments by Division/Departments
to dovolop building and slto
needs to establish base costs.

1.8,1.

Building and slto nooils
established and documented
b y 0/1/11(1.

l.C

Identify alternatives to existing
facilities and sites along with
projected financial Impact to

1.C.l.

Alternatives and financial
Impacts devolopod by

1 D

Incorporate all analysis Into a
comprehensive plan which will
ba responsive to
future noeds

1 D.l.

Comprohonslvo Plan
developed and approved
by 12/31/00 end
implemented consistent
with milestones

Evaluate Assignor) Car Policy
eligibility ant) financial
Impact lo

2.A

Evaluato current (leot practices
and fleet Information on eligibility
criteria and cost to amployeos of
a company furnished car.

J.A.I.

Poll c o m p l e t e d b y 3/31/0U
and documented

WEIGHTEO 0 15*

2 3

Evaluate current financial Impact
of
policy and
employee contributions.

2.B.I.

Detailed analysis
completed by 4/30/00
and report documented.

2-C

Rocommend changes supported by
analysis and publish to all
affected management personnel.

2.C.I.

Changes recommended
and approved by 6/1/00
and Implemented per
milestones Identified
In final report.

»!OAL

Dovolop a long-term facilities
plan for tha Metro facilities
which responds to corporate
naeds and community develop
ment pressures.

WltlGllTUl) 0 40\

lO/l/Ol).
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PLEBT 6 FACILITIES
1988 GOALS

COAL
Manage operating expenses not
to exceed $5,407,500 for 1988
Budget.

STRATEGY

METHOD OF MEASUREMENT

3.A,

Analyze and evaluate operational
effectiveness for services provided
and Implement plans to achieve
50,000 in savings through more
efficient utilization of available
resources.

3.A.I.

Plans developed by
4/15/88 and lmplementod
consistent with milestones.

3.B.

Review all departmental spending
plans for 1988 and reduce expendi
tures by $50,000 while maintaining
quality services to

3.B.I.

Document expense
ruductlons by 3/15/80
and Implement.

3,C.

Evaluate departmental operating
programs and assure a flexible
organization where functions are
cost effective, with programs and
procedures effectively supporting
Company, divisional, and depart
mental goals using a zero-basod
management approach.

3.C.I.

Plans developed by
3/15/80 and implemented
consistent with establishod
milestones.

3 0.

Dovolop key operating Indicators
Io r F l o a t 6 F a c i l i t i e s w h i c h c a n
be used to measure and Improve
performance.

3 O 1

2/2B/0Q.

3 0 2

Tracking system
lmplementod by 3/31/QG
with reporting to
divisional VP on a
soml-annua) basis

WEIGHTED 8 15*

Measures Identified by

FLEET 6 FACILITIES
1908 COALS

^OAL
Develop a comprehensive eorporato security plan to protect
property and ensure
employeo safety.

STRATEGY

METHOD OP MEASUREMENT

4.A,

Analyze and evaluate all
current security problems and
recommend solutions to enhance
site and building Integrity.

4.A.I.

Detailed report developed
by 7/1/08.

4 D

Incorporate oil findings and
recommendations Into a compre
hensive plan for ensuring safety
and security at all property sltos.

4 n.l.

Plan dovolopod nnrl '
approved by 9/1/UO nml
lmplementod consistent
with milestones.

4 C

Clearly communicate to all employees
corporate security expectations for
all buildings and property sites

4 C 1

Socurlty expectations
communications to all
employees by 12/31/00

5.A.

Evaluate services provided to
o t h e r divisions and DEI comp
anies and develop plans for
providing services at a mora
cost efficient rato or Incroasod
quality at tho same rate

5.A 1

Services Identifier) nnd
plan developed by
3/30/00

5,A 2

Plans Implemented
consistent with milestones
and moasures of
performance

6 A 1

Plans dovolopod for nil
major proportlos by
3/15/00 and lmplomentod
consistent with plan
milestones

WHIGlITLiO 0 1 0 \

i

Dovolop at loast 2 enhancod
services to customers In
other
divisions
or
companlos

WEIGHTED 0 10\

fi

Market excess propor'.les to
effectively support
financial goals

WI2ICIITED 0 10*

6.A

Evaluate all
and devolnp
keting plan
criteria for

excess properties
a strategic mar
which establishes
s a l e of properties

nTOwrca; FESOJTCS
1988 GDUS
JANlARJf 20, 1983

linage operating censes
consistent with Division and
Canpany Goals. (251)

Enhance services to other divisions
in
ard other
companies. (20%)

j-ETEDO CP j-CASURB-an'

STRAEXg

GOAL
l.A.

Departmental operating expenses
will rot exceed: $284,883.

l.A.l.

Financial reports.

l.B.

Utilizing zero-based management,
evaluate service programs and
interhal departniental procedures,
including automated systems, to
identify approaches for
effectively supporting Canpany
and divisional goals.

l.B.l.

Plan developed and
opportunities identified by
the end of first quartet 1903
and implefnented consistent with
established milestones.

l.C.

Identify operating indicators
which measure and improve
performance.

l.C.l.

Measures identified by 3/1/88.

l.C. 2.

Tracking system implejnented by
4/1/88, with report to Div.
V.P. at least every six nonths.

Develop and implement at least
one enhanced service to customers
in other
divisions.

2.A.I.

Servioe developed by 3/30/88.

2.A,2.

Develop and iroplerrent tracking
system bf 4/30/88 with reports
to Div. V.P. by 7/30/88 and
9/30/88.

Identify and implement at least
one enhanced service for other
cenpanies.

2.B.I.

Service identified ard
developed by 4/1/88.

2.B.2.

Tracking system in piece by
5/1/88.

2.A.

2.B.

Information Resources
1900 Goals
Page -2-

MZTECO CP hCASUREMgTr

STPA1SGY

3.

I tt *

Increase variety of media available
through Information Resources to
more adequately meet employee
information needs ar<3 appropriate
to modern technologies ard
lifestyles. (20%)

3 .A.

Select, acquire, organize and
promote a core collection of
audio cassettes cn topics
relevant to current ocrrpany
interests. Provide equipment ard
expertise to support the service.

3.A.I.

Plan of approach submitted and
approved by 7/31/88.

3.A.2.

Collection in place ard list of
new titles distributed by
11/30/88.

3.A.3.

Staff trained in use of
equipment
6/30/88.

3.3.

Identify sources ard develop and
prcrote clearinghouse service for
borrowing ard renting videotapes
and f i L ts .

3.8.1.

Service in place by 10/31/00

3-C.

Analyze A-V equipment needs
Prepare 3 year plan to update
necessary support equipment.

3 C.l.

Plan developed by <1/30/00

3.C.2.

Implement consistent with plan
as part of budget process.

3.D.I.

Approach determined arri
approved by 11/30/88, and
implemented as scheduled.

3.D.

Cevelcp a plan of approach to
improve services which support
rapidly Increasing information
needs of enployees using PC
systems.

Information Resources
1-988 Goals
i 3 age -3-

GD'-L
Improve access to and delivery
information without increasing
storage space or staff
requirements. (20%)

Establish a planned approach to
acquisition of new information
resources to provide adequate
support for current and future
company projects. (15%)

STRMBGy

j-CTTOO CP l-EASPRG-EOT

Evaluate at least 3 new online
retrieval systems for their
applicability to carpany needs.

4.A.1,

Recommendations by 5/31/08 fo
1989 budget planning.

Evaluate usefulness of software
systems which facilitate
downloading and editing online
data, and of "gateway" systems
which facilitate use of current
online systems. Recccrr.end
appropriate systems and develop
schedule for phased
implementation or future
evaluation.

4.B.I.

Recoamendaticos by 8/31/80.
Implemented consistent with
established milestones.

Evaluate potential use of
microformats for storage of
infrequently referenced
materials. Aralyze oosts and
benefits of the format and
necessary supporting equipment.

4.C.l.

Recommendation submitted by
10/31/88.

Develop criteria for analyzing
and prioritizing potential
resources to be purchased for
print and A-V collections,

5.A.I.

Criteria developed by 9/30/80
and implemented as
receomnerried.

Information Resources
1908 Goals
Page -<t-

GCAI,
5.

CO

Continued.

mrtou cF (-cAScmg^r

ST?:32XZ
5.3.

Identify data roqji rerants to
adequately analyze collection
usage ard areas needirg
development. Establish
milestones to design arri
i.Tpleront the system.

5.B.I.

Approach developed b/ 12/15/00
and implemented as scheduled.

Incentive Goals for Corporate Attorney
Fiscal 1988
Company wide return on equity target

20% weight

Legal Collections: 30% weight

25% earned if 60% collected
50% earned if 75% collected
100% earned if 80% collected with
interpolation of actual final #

Regulatory:

40% weight

10% achieve new classifications as
proposed
10% accomplishment
recovery
of
balancing account dollars
10% obtain increased revenues in final
order over interim level - 1/2
achieved if additional revenues
exceed $25,000, 100% earned
if
additional revenues exceed $50,000
10% achieve reduction in City Gate of
6%, 9%, 12% to acquire 50%, 75%
and 100% of this 10%

Corporate:

10% weight

3% perform
analysis
of
total
expenditures for legal services by
all
company
departments
and
propose plan to reduce those
expenditures by 20% annually
3% keep
expenditures
for
Legal
Department 10% below budget
4% assist in load building by either
providing marketing department
with five leads or two additional
appliance conversions; and by
accomplishing regulatory approval
for outdoor gas lighting

Signature - Supervisor

Signature - Participant

Date

ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT AND OPERATING SUPERINTENDENT
FISCAL -1988 MANAGER BONUS GOALS

GOALS TO BE COMPLETED BY DUE DATES LISTED OR BY JUNE 30, 1988
TO QUALIFY 80% AVAILABLE BONUS UNDER THE MANAGEMENT BONUS
PROGRAM.
25%

1.

Implementation of Random Sampling Meter Program to re
place present 10 year Periodic Test Program.
25% if implemented by November 1, 1987
15% if implemented by January 1, 1988
10% if implemented by March 31, 1988

20%

2.

Reduce Distribution Department Operations and Maintenance
expenses through productivity improvements and man
power planning.
100% - 5% decrease in expenses from Fiscal 1988
budget level
50% - 3% decrease in expenses from Fiscal 1988
budget level

25% - 1% decrease in expenses from Fiscal 1988
budget level
10% - .5% decrease in expenses from Fiscal 1980
budget level
15% 3. Reduce fleet gasoline usage by increased C.N.G. usage
15% if a 50% reduction in gallons of gasoline is
realized
10% if a 30% reduction in gallons of gasoline is
realized
5% if 10% reduction in gallons of gasoline is
realized
5% 4. Assist with training of two welders "
" - t0 a
assure certification in electric arc welding by
September 30. 1987.
Certification qualification
to be done by Northern Engineering and Testing Lab
oratories as specified in A.P.I. 1104.
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5% 5.

Develop good working relationship and open communications
with Distribution -Foreman
a. Inform foreman of Company's and superintendents expec
tations before August 1. 1987
b. Have distribution foreman meet with superintendent
each Friday afternoon at 4.15 with tentative work
schedule for following week.
c. Foreman to spend at least I hour per day in the office
planning the following days work schedule, com
plete paper work, stores issue sheets, arrange
utility locations, and answer requests of Fran or
Marylou.
d. Foreman to plan main renewal projects on week in
advance of scheduling work. Hold a 15 min pre-con
meeting Friday morning with construction person
nel to discuss project and receive input.
e. Work with superintendent to improve planning
abilities.
Superintendent to submit quarterly re
port to president on general foreman's progress in
getting work distributed by 4:30 previous day and
general overview of 4:15 planning improvements.

5% 6.

Increase sales by marketing leads.
100% if 40 leads convert to new gas appliance sales
50% if 25 leads convert to new gas appliance sales
35% if 15 leads convert to new gas appliance sales

5% 7.

Rewrite performance standards of subordinates to be re
sults oriented.
5% if 100% are rewritten
3% if
75% are rewritten
2% if
50% are rewritten

HUfiAN RESOURCE MANAGER

DATE*"

SAPPROVED

Participant
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F1988 SPECJ FIC OBJECTIVES
FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGER
August 10, 1987

I.

FURTHER IMPROVE CUSTOMER SERVICE

Customer service superiority will be improved when we recognize that
customer relations mirror employee relations. To this extent, Human
Resources will focus its attention on management and front-line supervi
sors to provide training in supportive skills which should build abili
ties of effective management.
A.

Each manager and supervisor will be trained on how to conduct more
effective performance appraisals by the end of F1988.
35% Measurable Specific Objective: Halo effect of performance
evaluations to be held at F1987 levels (4.01) or below:
*100%
* 95%
* 90%
* 85%
* 80%
* 75%

earned
earned
earned
earned
earned
earned

if
if
if
if
if
if

average
average
average
average
average
average

ratings
ratings
ratings
ratings
ratings
ratings

are
are
are
are
are
are

below 3.86
3.87 - 3.89
3.90 - 3.92
3.93 - 3.95
3.96 - 3.98
3.99 - 4.01

B. A more effective performance appraisal system for the Service Center
union personnel will be developed. Job standards will be geared
more to measurable objectives. This will be completed by June 1,
1988.
5% Measurable Specific Objective: Twenty positions completed;
*5%
*3%
*2%
*0%

earned
earned
earned
earned

if
if
if
if

15 - 20 positions are completed
10 - 15 positions are completed
5 - 10 positions are completed
less than 5 positions are completed

C. An on-going training program coordinated to include managers in the
training process will continue for first level supervisors to
develop skills in:
Communications
- October, 1987
Delegation
- December, 1987
Reward-Discipline - January, 1988
Time Management - March, 1988
Other areas as needed.
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10% Measurable Specific Objective: After productivity training,
managers should be able to 'cut payroll budgets by 10%. The Human
Resource Department will lead by example.

*10%
* 9%
* 8%
* 7%
* 6%
* 5%
D

earned
earned
earned
earned
earned
earned

if
if
if
if
if
if

payroll
payroll
payroll
payroll
payroll
payroll

budget
budget
budget
budget
budget
budget

is
is
is
is
is
is

cut
cut
cut
cut
cut
cut

more than $1644
$1534-$1643
$1423-$1533
$1312-$1422
$1201-$1311
under $1200

Provide input from employee developmental plans to design overall
training programs, in cooperation with the Training Task Force. To
be completed by September, 1987.

PROVIDE MORE CHALLENGING AND REWARDING WORK FOR EACH EMPLOYEE
•Job enrichment and challenging employees' creativity will be enhanced as
position descriptions more closely resemble actual duties. These duties
must carry realistic job standards to measure productivity.
A. Job standards for each non-union, non-exempt employee will be devel
oped to reflect at least three new measurements for each position.
Managers, supervisors, and employees will be involved in the process
to reflect effective and measurable criteria in order to make intel
ligent evaluations. At the same time, job descriptions will be re
viewed to recommend changes in major responsibilities. Standards
are to be upgraded by June 30, 1988.
15% Measurable Specific Objective:
*15%
*14%
*13%
*12%
*11%
* 0%

earned
earned
earned
earned
earned
earned

if
if
if
if
if
if

116 - 125 new measurements
106 - 115 new measurements
96 - 105 new measurements
86 - 95 new measurements
76 - 85 new measurements
less than 75 new measurements

0. Reduce employee absenteeism by 20% from F1987 records. This is re
corded absence for illness or doctor hours five days of less in
duration.
5% Measurable Specific Objective:
*5% earned if absenteeism is reduced by 20%
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C. The F1988 Wage and Salary Program will be announced to the employees
by June 24, 1987. This includes an explanation of the salary survey
conducted, the six point evaluation criteria, and the pay-forperformance grid. Emphasis will be stressed that merit is the key
to raises. An on-going individual plant will continue to show em
ployees exactly where they placed in the survey, and also the poten
tial for raises under the new grid. A guideline for managers on how
to justify exceptional and outstanding performers will be issued by
July 31, 1987. A monitoring system for the salary program to con
tinuously record the following will be developed:
DATE

DEPI

EMPLOYEE

BASE
WAGE

$
INCREASE

%
INCREASE

RATINGS

Total:
This system will allow senior management to monitor wage increases
quarterly. Completion date is September 30, 1987.

III. SELL MORE GAS
In concert with the Marketing Department, develop and implement an Em
ployee Incentive Plan to encourage maximum participation.
A. Submit leads for new (or converted) gas appliances which result in
ten such actual appliance sales.
10% Measurable Specific Objective:
*100% earned if ten appliances are sold.

Both employee and supervisor have agreed to the above objectives on this
of
1987.
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SIJF^RVISOR - FISCAl '.9R3 - INCENTIVE PLAN
DISTRIBUTION FOREMAN

75% of the incentive bonus will be based on specific
objectives. 25% of the incentive plan will be based
upon the company's overall performance (R.O.E.)
1

40% 2.

10% of bonus will be achieved when a typed detailed
construction report for main renewals is prioritized
and time table with estimated starting dates has been
submitted on or before April 1, 1988.
Reduction of temporary laborer payroll costs. By
scheduling temporary employee hiring to coincide with
peak work load periods.
REDUCTION

15%

Raw salary's costs

100%

30%

$15,000

50%

20%

10,500

25%

10%

5,500

10%

5%

2,700

3.

Reduce regular payroll costs by improved productivity and
planning.

50% This goal will be satisfied when the "next days scheduled
work is distributed to the crews prior to 4:30 p.m.
50% Also provide fill in work log for personnel when assigned
jobs have been completed ahead of scheduled or have
been cancelled, and you are not available. Copy of log
submitted to superintendent monthly indicating fill jobs,
completion dates, and signatures.
15%

4

Reduce overall service line installation costs by reducing
the average payroll unit cost per service as calculated
from the Year to Date Data Processing Payroll Account
Report.
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REDUCTION OF AVERAGE PAYROLL UNIT COSTS

10%

5.

5%

S2.00

10%

5.00

15%

10 00

Reduce 300 account installation average unit costs per
service stub.

REDUCTION OF AVERAGE PAYROLL UNIT COST

5%

1.00

10%

3.00

10% 6. Increased sales by marketing leads.
100% if 6 leads convert to new gas appliance
sales.
50% if 3 leads convert to new gas appliance
sales
35% if 2 leads convert to new gas appliance
sales.

Date

Human Resource Manager

Date

President
Approved ^
Disapproved

Approved/
disapproved
EMPLOYEE
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APPENDIX 6

SUMMARY TABLES OF
AGA EXECUTIVE SALARY SURVEY RESULTS 1987
SUMMARY TABLES FOR INCENTIVE PAY PLANS
All Member Respondents
Smaller Company Survey
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APPENDIX 6A

Sti American Gas
e a Association

l 51 5 Wilson Boulevard. Arlington, Va. 22209
1 elcphor.e (703J 311-8073

August

MichacI I. German

1,

1937

Vice President
Planning and Analysis

D e a r PJCTICIp a n C
The 1937 American Gas Association Compensation Surveys
rc fleet a number of significant changes from prior surveys.
The Compensation & Benefits Committee, tl\e s t a f f of A.G.A.
and the consultants of Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen have combined
their efforts to improve the comprehensiveness, quality and
timeliness of the surveys.
We t r u s t t h a t you w i l l f i n d t h e
results more useful and reliable.
The survey this year contains four sections.
Those in which
you have participated are included, or will be forwarded to
you shortly.
The sections and the number of firms
participating in each a r e :
Corporate lloard of Directors
Execut ive
Managerial, Supervisory and Professional
Administrative Policies

37
95
99
100

All of the data is effective as of Macch 1, 1907.
The
introduction to each acccion clarifies the way that the data
is presented.
Please take the time to cead these
clari f icat ions.
The formats have been developed to maximize the celevance of
the analysis and protect the confidentiality of the
p a r t i c i p a n t d a t a . W h e c e d a t a .nay h a v e a l l o w e d i n d i v i d u a l
company information to be identified, the data ha3 not been
shown.
We also want to remind you that »very participant
has signed an agreement to tceat the results of this survey
confidentially.
A d a t a l i s t i n g o f y o u c ficra's p o s i t i o n m a t c h e s t o t h e s u r v e y
positions is enclosed foe your referenca.
If some of your
initial position responsas were not included in the survey,
it means that the Mercer Consultants did not believe that
the data submitted met theic comfort level foe degree of
match.
This should not necessarily preclude you from
deciding the match is appropriate for your purposes.
While we believe major improvements have been made in this
year's survey, the need for numerous other format
improvements has become evident as we implemented our plans.
Y o u c s u p p o r t in t h e f o r m o f c o m m e n t s a n d r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s i s
necessary to make next year's survey even better.
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Aug use 1 ,

Page Two

1987

l a t h e n e a r f u t u r e y o u u i LL r e c e i v e a q u e s t i o n n a i r e a s k i n g
Cor your assessment of t h i s year's survey and what i s needed
Cor next year.
We a r e a l s o p l a n n i n g a m e e t i n g i n O r l a n d o ,
Flocida on October 15th to develop plans for next year's
survey.
You a r e i n v i t e d t o a t t e n d .
IC you have any questions on the survey process please
c o n t a c t P a t C u r l e y a t A.G.A. ( 703 / 3 41-3-197 ) .
Questions on
specific position inCormation should be directed to Hoyt
Doyel or Barbara Markovetz at Morcer-Meidinqer-iUnsen (303/
031-7100).
Wo a p p r e c i a t e y o u r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e g r o u p s u r v e y s a n d
l o o k Corward t o s e r v i n g you ir, t h e f u t u r e .
Sincecely,

Michael 1. G

Enclosures
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1987

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
SURVEY RESULTS

Copyright/ 1987
by the

American Gas Association
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T a b l e II
INCENTIVE PLAN ANALYSIS
All Firms

Coroorate
Avg

Eflgltton
901
902
903
960
928
912
910
950
956
914
926
916
940
934
938
930
952
954
936
922
932
918
924
920

Title
Chief Executive Officer
Chief Operating Officer
Executive Vice President
Top Exploration and Production Executive
Top Legal Executive
Top Financial Executive
Top Administrative Executive
Top Operations Executive
Top Gas Supply Executive
Controller
Top Human Resources Executive
Treasurer
Top Marketing Executive
Top Rate Executive
Top Governmental Affairs Executive
Secretary - Legal
Division Operations Executive
Top Engineering Executive
Top Public Relations. Executive
Top D.P./M.I.S. Executive
Secretary - Non-Legal
Top Tax Executive
Top Purchasing Executive
Top Internal Auditor

NS = Insufficient data for analysis

mum*
39'/.
49
22
46
46
42
43
39
43
37
38
36
39
43
38
60
46
33
29
24
34
31
14
22

29%
22
21
22
20
20
15
19
17
19
16
16
17
14
19
14
18
17
15
16
18
15
18
14

Avg
Maximum 7475C
32
25
45
33
32
25
29
30
37
29
28
31
27
35
25
29
26
27
26
31
27
29
25

Subsidiaries
Avg
Avg
Maximum '/.
Eligible
Target %
57%
61
NS
Combined
67
59
67
Combined
Combined
73
56
54
Combined
Combined
Combined
NS
Combined
Combined
Combined
35
NS
13
25
25

40%
43

27%
25
-

vl th
19
19
20
with
with
17
16
16
with
with
with

-

Corp.
32
'34
44
Corp.
Corp.
33
32
28
Corp.
Corp.
Corp.

-

with Corp
with Corp
wl th Corp
16
-

4
4
20

-

27
-

5
25

Table C

INCENTIVE PLAN CHARACTERISTICS
PERCENT Of EMPLOYEES ELIGIBLE FOR PROGRAMS

'net
Posi tion

O
•NJ

901
902
903
960
928
912
910
950
95$
914
926
916
940
934
938
930
952
954
936
922
932
918
924
920

Title

Chief Exec. Off.
Chief Op. Off. Pres.
Exec. V. P.
Top Expl. k Prod. Exec.
Top Legal Exec.
Top Fin. Exec.
Top Adm. Exec.
Top Opr. Exee.
Top Gas Supply Exec.
Controller
Top H. R. Exec.
Treasurer
Top Mktg Exec.
Top Rate Exec.
Top Gov. Affairs Exec.
Seer. - Legal
Oiv. Opr. Exec.
Top Engr. Exee.
Top P. R. Exee.
Top D.P./M.I.S. Exec.
Seer. - Non-Legal
Top Tax Exee.
Top Purch. Exee.
Top Internal Aud.

ISO • Incentive Stock Options
NQ • Non-Qualified
RS • Restricted Stock
SAR • Stock Appreciation Rights

Corpora te
Sub;i di a ry
Stock loCQfUivo
Stock Incentive Plan;
Cash Incentive Plan;
LongShortMidLongTerra
Term
Tera
Term
Other (Annual 1 (2-4 Yrs) (5 * Yrs) ISO

P1«n«

ShortMidTerm
Term'
(Annual) ( 1

HQ Si iAB Other

la) (5_i_Ia) JLifi afi as SA5

32X
34
17
38
36
28
22
29
37
28
32
29
35
36
35
40
47
27
23
20
28
28
8
15

4%
3
11
5
5
4
4
4
7
2
2
3
5
3
2
2
3
2
3
3
3
2

n
3
0
0
8
7
4
4
2
2
8
7
3
3
3
0
3
2
0
6
7
0
0
0

24X
14
39
53
31
23
17
25
31
20
21
22
29
25
30
40
33
21
23
14
21
19
3
13

21X
11
11
31
21
20
9
17
27
15
17
20
2)
26
35
20
25
13
16
12
24
13
0
9

13%
14
11
31
13
12
0
8
10
9
8
9
9
10
15
10
5
5
3
6
10
6
3
7

15*
11
17
15
18
12
4
9
14
17
11
18
12
13
20
20
7
10
10
4
17
9
3
7

r\

sr.
3
6
15
5
7
4
3
0
7
6
7
3
2
5
0
10
2
3
4
10
6
3
4

50X
57

14X

67
S3
50

7
12
0

54
56
46

4
e

30

5

13
13
38

0
0
13

<

A

86X 79X 29X 2IX
ox
26
52 65 39
13
Insuf f ici ent data
Combi ned vi th corporate
27
47 53 20
0
13
59 53 29
0
16
33 33 33
0
Combined wi th corpora te
Combined with corporate
23
50 S4 15
0
16
36 4B 16
0
0
77 46 0
0
Combi ned wi th corpora te
Combi ned wi th corpora to
Combined with corporate
Insufficient data
Combi ned wi th corpora te
Combi ned wi th corporate
Combi ned with corporate
20
45 30
0
0
Insufficient data
13
25 25 0
0
6
13 13 0
0
13
25 25 0
0

OX
13

7
0
0

8
A

0

0
0
0
0
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;01S V,'ih:o:t Boulevard. Arlington. Vn. 2220S

Ass00;.~ii0n

":-:jp l ~or.o.(.'03) 8<: 1 -83 7 3

Michael I. German

V'ir.o

January' 20, 1988

Dear Participant:

Subject:

Smaller Company Compensation Survey

The Compensation & Benefits Committee and the staff of
A.G.A. have worked together to produce a special edition
of
our compensation for smaller companies survey. This special
edition is tailored for companies whose gross annual
revenues are in the 0-500 million size range. We trust that
you will find the results useful and reliable.
The special edition contains three sections. Those in which
you have participated are included, or will be forwarded to
you shortly. The sections and the number of firms
participating in each are:
Executive
Managerial, Supervisory and Professional
Administrative Policies

69
66
71

All of the data is effective as of March 1, 1987. The
introduction to each section clarifies the way that the data
is presented.
The formats have been developed to maximize the relevance of
the analysis and protect the confidentiality of the
participant data. Where data may have allowed individual
company information to be identified, the data has not been
shown. We also want to remind you that every participant
has signed an agreement to treat the results of this survey
confidentially.
A data listing of your firm's position matches to the survey
positions is enclosed .for .your reference. If some of your
initial position responses were not included in the survey,
it means that the Mercer Consultants did not believe that
the data submitted met their comfort level for degree of
match. This should not necessarily preclude you from
deciding the match is appropriate for your purposes.
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January 20,
Page Two

1908

If you have any questions on the survey process please
contact Pat Curley at A G A (703/841-8497).
We appreciate
your participation in the group surveys and look forward to
serving you in the future

Micl/ael I. Gedian

enclosures
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Table B
INCENTIVE PLAN ANALYSIS
All Firms

Position
901
902
910
928
912
903
960
956
950
9^0
930
91^
931

926
922
952

95*<

916
936
938

918
932
92^
920

Title
Chief Executive Officer
Chief Operating Officer
Top Administrative Executive
Top Legal Executive
Top Financial Executive
Executive Vice President
Top Exploration and Production
Executive
Top Gas Supply Executive
Top Operations Executive
Top Marketing Executive
Secretary - Legal
Controller
Top Rate Executive
Top Human Resources Executive
Top D.P./M.I.S. Executive

A
Eligible
382
46
43
4o
35

Avg

Target %
152
13
9
14
13

26%

33

0

20

40
16
37
27

13
11
11
11

25
20
18
17

67
.37
33

3
10
11
12
12

13
27
15
19
16

25

9
10
10
10

13
12
18
16
11

26
21

Division Operations Executive
Top Engineering Executive
Treasurer
Top Public Relations Executive
Top Governmental Affairs
Executive

26

17

13

Top Tax Executive
Secretary - Non-Legal
Top Purchasing Executive
Top Internal Auditor

25
32

8

6

NIP

17

6

24

29

4

NIP = For this position no companies have incentive programs.
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Avg
Maximum
23
20
27
22

11
13
NIP
11

Tabic C

INCENTIVE PLAI CHARACTERISTICS
PERCENT OF EMPLOYEE ELIGIBLE FOR PROGRAMS

Position
Title
901
Chief Executive Officer
902
Chief Operating Officer
910
Top Administrative Executive
928
Top Legal Executive
912
T o p F i n a n c i a l Executive

903

Executive Vice President

9b0
956
950
9'l0

Top Exploration and Production
Executive
Top Gas Supply Executive
Top Operations Executive
Top Marketing Executive

930
91'l
93''
926

Secretary - Legal
Controller
Top Rate Executive
Top Human Resources Executive

922

Top D.P./M.I.S. Executive

952
954
916
936
938

918
932
924
920

Cash
Incentive Plans
Short- Mic- LongTcra Term
re rm
30?
52
62
29
3
9
0
22
9
28
S
8
4
22
6

Stock
Incentive Plans

252
9
22
20
18'

NQ
172
14
17
12
12

ISO

RS

SAR 1Other

82
6
4
8
6

82
3
9
4
4

22
11
4
4
2

0

0

0

33

0

0

0

0

40
38
23
22

0
8
3
2

0
4
3
4

40
17
12
18

20
8
8
4

20
8
3
4

0
8
3
4

0
0
2
2

33
20
24
22
19

0
7
6
4
4

0
2
3
7
6

33
10
9
13
11

0
7
6
9
9

0
5
3
4
0

0
5
6
4
2

0
7
0
4
2

Division Operations Executive
Top Engineering Executive
Treasurer
Top Public Relations Executive
Top Governmental Affairs
Executive

28
17
21
19

2
0
6
3

0
2
9
0

4
10
24
8

4
5
12
3

7
7
3
3

4
5
6
3

0
0
6
0

17

0

0

8

8

8

17

0

Top Tax Executive
Secretary - Non-Legal
Top Purchasing Executive
Top Internal Auditor

25
21
3
10

6
0
0
3

0
5
0
0

13
21
3
13

6
5
0
3

6
11
3
6

13
11
3
3

0
0
0
0
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